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INTRODUCTION 
Judges produce opinions for numerous purposes.  A judicial opinion 
decides a case and informs the parties whether they won or lost.  But in a 
common law system, the most important purpose of the opinion, particular-
ly the appellate opinion, is to educate prospective litigants, lawyers, and 
lower court judges about the law: what it is and how it applies to a specific 
set of facts.  Without this purpose, courts could more quickly and efficiently 
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issue one-sentence rulings rather than set forth reasons.  By issuing opi-
nions, courts give actors a means of evaluating whether their actions are 
within the bounds of law.  Under this predictive conception, when an opi-
nion suggests a change in how a particular legal regime will apply in the fu-
ture, one would expect individuals to adjust their behavior.  The judicial 
system is leveraged in that appellate courts issue opinions in a small percen-
tage of disputes; however, the explanations for how and why the appellate 
court decided particular cases are used to predict outcomes across a range of 
varying factual scenarios. 
The importance of judicial opinions to legal education cannot be over-
stated.  Case law is the dominant teaching tool for the vast majority of law 
school classes, especially in the first year.  Law professors parse the lan-
guage and logic of opinions in critical analyses of the answers to legal ques-
tions.  The higher the court, the more care is taken in parsing the texts that 
the court produces, and the wording of Supreme Court opinions is some-
times given the type of care ordinarily reserved for religious texts.  Argua-
bly, the primary skill that law schools teach (“thinking like a lawyer”) is the 
ability to carefully parse judicial opinions.1  By contrast, other materials that 
might be thought to contain information about the operation of law—
statutes, contracts, property deeds, and academic studies—are typically 
used only as supplements to the cases.  
An often unstated assumption of scholarship and education is that the 
reasons the judges offer in judicial opinions are central to understanding 
law.2  Indeed, the sometimes heated debates between traditional legal scho-
lars and political scientists center on what to make of the reasons offered by 
judges.3  Although social scientists are generally skeptical of the importance 
that traditional legal scholars attach to the textual parsing of judicial opi-
nions, the social scientists who study law also use opinions as sources of in-
sight.  For example, some scholars use opinions as evidence of underlying 
preferences and institutional dynamics.4  Yet whether judicial opinions ex-
 
1  Orin Kerr explains that “[l]earning to ‘think like a lawyer’ often means learning to think like a 
judge, which means learning how to evaluate what rules and explanations are strong and which are 
weak.”  Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Legal Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 
51, 61 (2007), available at http://volokh.com/files/howtoreadv2.pdf. 
2  Some scholars have argued that the reasons offered are far more important than the outcome 
reached in a particular case.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995). 
3  A window into this debate is available through an exchange between two longtime federal appel-
late judges—and former law professors—over these assumptions.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK (2008); Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009); Ri-
chard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177 
(2010). 
4  For examples of early political science scholarship analyzing the content of judicial opinions ei-
ther to make predictions about future court behavior or to gain insights into judicial preferences, see 
Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the “Right 
to Counsel” Cases, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1957); Glendon Schubert, Jackson’s Judicial Philosophy: 
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plain why an outcome is dictated by the law or reveal underlying policy 
views that justify and legitimize the exercise of judicial authority, they tell 
consumers of law what they should expect courts to do in the future. 
But are the pronouncements in these appellate opinions in fact an accu-
rate reflection of the law as understood in the world beyond the courthouse?  
In our study of the effects of a particular employment discrimination case in 
the Nevada casino industry, we found that judicial opinions had little sa-
lience in the communities that we had expected to be affected by the court’s 
reasoning.  And while opinions may help predict how lower courts will act 
in the future, they do not tell us whether and which cases will be brought to 
court with sufficient resources and legal skill to allow for a meaningful res-
olution on the merits.  In light of these limitations on the power of appellate 
opinions, we should reconsider their central role in our understanding of the 
relationship between law and those governed by it. 
We can better understand law by moving beyond our court-centric 
perspective to a view that includes community understanding.  Two classic 
studies, Stewart Macaulay’s examination of how business people in Wis-
consin understood their contracts5 and Robert Ellickson’s study of property 
disputes among neighboring ranchers in Shasta County, California,6 ex-
amined the influence of formal law in social context.  In both studies, social 
realities were far more important than formal law in shaping behavior.  
Both Macaulay and Ellickson were building on the insights of the original 
Legal Realists: to understand law, we must go out and see what the law 
means to people whose actions are governed by it.  Macaulay looked at con-
tracts; Ellickson looked at statutes.  Seeking to build on their work, our fo-
cus in this Article is on the primary teaching tool of the law professor: the 
appellate opinion.   
The Legal Realists’ original idea was to understand law by looking at 
how it worked in the real world.  The Old Realism was premised on the 
idea that legal scholars should go out into the field and collect data (al-
though the original scholars often included more arguments for empirical 
work than actual examples of it).7  In recent years, building on the increas-
ing influence of both political science and economics on legal scholarship, a 
New Legal Realism has emerged whose proponents are often skilled empi-
                                                                                                                           
An Exploration in Value Analysis, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 940 (1965); and S. Sidney Ulmer, Quantitative 
Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical Applications, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 164 (1963).  For more recent examples, see Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie 
with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813 (2010); Donald 
R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity 
Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963 (1992); and Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling 
Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (2004). 
5  Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55 (1963). 
6  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
7  See infra notes 2021 and accompanying text. 
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ricists and whose focus is on how lawyers and judges in fact operate in con-
text.8  New Legal Realists look at lawyers and judges in context and seek to 
test models of judicial behavior, the most common being that judicial beha-
vior is driven by judges’ policy preferences.9  Broadly speaking, the New 
Legal Realism generally has a top-down feel to it: the scholars posit models 
based on theory and then collect data to test the model.  We do not quarrel 
with this method of study—to do so would be more than a bit hypocritical 
for at least two of us.10  But it strikes us as somewhat at odds with the old 
Legal Realism.11  The Old Realism was more oriented toward studying law 
from the bottom up: the researcher looked to the actions and perspectives of 
individuals to help understand how law operated.12  It was not about under-
standing judicial behavior and courts in context but rather about the opera-
tion of law in context.13  
The current project seeks to add to our knowledge of the relevance of 
case law by focusing on an area that has received little examination: how 
pronouncements about employment discrimination law by appellate courts 
translate into the understandings and behavior of employees, employers, 
and their attorneys.  As our lens, we use evidence of how people talk about 
the relevance of changes in the law.  Law professors typically assume that 
lawyers read appellate cases carefully and then translate their nuances into 
instructions and arguments for their clients.  After all, that is our justifica-
tion for spending three years teaching law students how to read these cases.  
 
8  See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 
(2008).   
9  Id. at 835. 
10  See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157. 
11  To be fair, Professors Nourse and Shaffer, in their articulation of what New Legal Realism cov-
ers, do include “bottom-up” contextual studies.  See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of 
New Legal Realism, Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70 
(2010).  And the primary example of this kind of work is Macaulay’s study of contracting practices 
among Wisconsin businessmen.   
12  The top-down/bottom-up distinction captures two aspects of Legal Realism.  First, theories are 
derived from observations “on the ground” (empirical research in the relevant communities) rather than 
being driven either by abstract theory or by the ability to use the newest statistical tools on large data-
sets.  Second, the theories look beyond the boundaries of formal law.  See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It 
Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 339–41 (describing the bottom-up approach); 
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (a seminal article on the uses 
of empirical data to illuminate the differences between legal conceptions of contract and actual practic-
es). 
13  Karl Llewellyn, in his classic The Cheyenne Way, used the techniques of anthropology to study 
the quasi-legal institutions and norms (which he described collectively as “law-ways”) of the Cheyenne 
Indians, including substantive rights and dispute resolution bodies.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. 
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
(1941).   
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But there has been little attempt to inquire into whether social realities un-
dermine that assumption.   
We examine the impact of an en banc Ninth Circuit employment dis-
crimination decision from 2006, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.14  At 
issue was a policy requiring female, but not male, bartenders to wear 
“[m]ake up (foundation/concealer and/or face powder, as well as blush and 
mascara) . . . and . . . [l]ip color . . . at all times.”15  Darlene Jespersen, a 
veteran casino bartender, sued Harrah’s for sex discrimination.16  Jespersen 
lost at every stage but did make it all the way to the en banc Ninth Circuit.17  
And the en banc court granted a small victory to Jespersen’s supporters: the 
majority hinted that it would be receptive to future challenges to appearance 
standards on the ground that they are based on sexual stereotyping.  Many 
workplace grooming guidelines would not survive such a test.18  Few other 
appellate cases from that period generated anywhere near the amount of at-
tention among legal academics that this case did.  It arguably represented a 
significant change in the law regarding appearance discrimination.  At the 
very least, it added clarity to a highly ambiguous area of law.  Either way, 
this was precisely the type of case that should have influenced understand-
ings of law on the ground.   
In Part I we describe the scholarship and ideas behind the work of the 
original Legal Realists and our reasons for utilizing their techniques.  In 
Part II we explain our choice of Jespersen as a case study.  Part III lays out 
methodology and data.  Part IV describes our findings from interviews with 
three sets of local actors: casino employees, lawyers, and judges.  Part V 
concludes by asking if and when case law is relevant locally. 
I. OLD LEGAL REALISM 
Beginning in the 1930s, Legal Realists advocated for a more realistic 
view of courts and law than the dominant formalist view, which empha-
 
14  444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
15  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d en banc, 
444 F.3d 1104.  
16  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076, 
aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104.  Jespersen concurrently filed tort and contract claims in state court.  Jes-
persen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., No. CV02-04471 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2002) (granting motion to dismiss), 
aff’d, 131 P.3d 614 (Table) (Nev. 2004). 
17  Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189. 
18  See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy Dress 
Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 257, 279–80 (2007) (concluding that casino cocktail waitress 
uniforms would not meet required bona fide occupational qualification standards); Kimberly A. Yurack-
o, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More Complete Theory of Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 892–93 (2006) (arguing that, strictly speaking, a sex 
stereotyping prohibition should prohibit sex-specific grooming codes but observing that no court had yet 
struck down such a grooming code on stereotyping grounds).  
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sized the constraining role of legal text on the behavior of judges.19  The 
Realists were a loosely connected group of lawyers, judges, and legal aca-
demics united more by their opposition to formalism than by their support 
for any particular theory of law.  Some Realists emphasized the role of per-
sonal beliefs and values in shaping judicial decisions; others focused on de-
scribing the divergence between the law on the books and the law in action.   
The first Legal Realists were law professors who went out into the 
world to see how the law operated in action.20  Underhill Moore and Charles 
Callahan literally looked outside their office windows to see how parking 
regulations affected the actions of automobile drivers in New Haven, Con-
necticut.21  Although it focused on driver compliance with posted time lim-
its for parking, a relatively inconsequential legal issue except when one is 
actually hunting for the elusive urban parking space, Moore and Callahan’s 
methodology was significant because it reflected and anticipated a move-
ment to examine the relationship between law and context.22 
In his lifelong study of state courts, The Common Law Tradition: De-
ciding Appeals, Karl Llewellyn, a true Old Realist in his methods, ex-
plained that he attempted “to use that child’s-eye approach advocated by the 
realistic realists of the late ’20’s and the early ’30’s.”23  Realism, argued 
Llewellyn, is a method, rather than a philosophy.24  Llewellyn counseled 
scholars to “[s]ee it fresh” and “[s]ee it as it works.”25  Llewellyn was seek-
ing to explain how judges reached certain decisions given the law that ex-
isted at the time.  How did judges use the law?  And when and how would 
they set it aside? 
 
19  For a history of American Legal Realism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 19271960 (1986), and JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). 
20  See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (applying psychological model to 
study of modern legal mind); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS (1960); L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).  Llewellyn later claimed 
to have introduced the “Realistic Jurisprudence” label into legal scholarship in his 1930 Columbia Law 
Review article.  LLEWELLYN, supra, at 512. 
21  See Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Con-
trol, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943); see also John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical So-
cial Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980) (discussing the 
significance of Moore and Callahan’s work). 
22  See F.S.C. Northrop, Underhill Moore’s Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance, 59 YALE L.J. 
196 (1950). 
23  LLEWELLYN, supra note 20, at 508; see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (providing a more thorough discussion of Llewellyn’s association with the 
realist movement). 
24  See LLEWELLYN, supra note 20, at 509 & n.2. 
25  See id. at 510. 
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Numerous scholars followed Llewellyn’s advice to “[s]ee [the law] as 
it works.”26  The Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings, for example, 
inspired several studies of the effects of such rulings on the behavior of po-
lice officers and criminals.27  An enterprising group of Yale law students 
observed New Haven police interrogations; interviewed detectives, lawyers, 
and suspects; and collected arrest, charge, and conviction numbers to eva-
luate the impact of Miranda.28  But after the initial burst of interest, such 
empirical studies disappeared for two decades even though debates over 
Miranda continued.29 
We are all Realists now,30 or so it is said.  New Legal Realism can be 
found in legal theories such as law and economics, cognitive psychology 
and law, empirical legal studies, and sociolegal scholarship.31  But New Le-
gal Realism has deviated from the original goals of Legal Realism.32  New 
 
26  See, e.g., H. Frank Way, Jr., Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Read-
ing Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189 (1968) (investigating the effects of the Court’s First Amendment Estab-
lishment Clausedecisions on school boards and personnel). 
27  The most studied decisions were Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which adopted the exclu-
sionary rule preventing the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search 
and seizure, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which requires police officers to advise cus-
todial suspects of their rights prior to interrogation.  See, e.g., NEAL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA (1971); JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 15152 (1974) (finding that police generally seek to bypass legal rulings that limit their 
productivity, especially as measured by clearance rates); Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in 
Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1974); 
see also Lawrence Baum, Police Response to Appellate Court Decisions: Mapp and Miranda, 7 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 425 (1978) (building a theory of the possible effects of exclusionary rules on police investiga-
tions and briefly reviewing empirical research examining police response); Richard A. Leo, The Impact 
of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631 n.72 (1996) (citing studies published 
shortly after Miranda was issued). 
28  Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 
(1967). 
29  Richard Leo found that empirical studies of the impact of Miranda disappeared by 1973 when 
James W. Witt published his study, Non-coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973).  Richard 
A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-first Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 
1005 (2001).  After more than two decades without any real world study, Leo and others have returned 
to the field to examine the effect of Miranda.  See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). 
30  Although he has expressed skepticism of this general claim, Richard Posner recognizes that  
“[t]hough Holmes is venerated by lawyers and judges, the legalistic view continues to dominate profes-
sional discourse about judging”—a problem Posner attempts to tackle.  Posner, supra note 3, at 1178. 
31  For a discussion of the rise and scope of New Legal Realism, see Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 
11, which “map[s] the precursors to an emerging ‘new legal realism,’ address[es] how the varieties of 
new legal realism build from their realist forbears, critique[s] these varieties, and attempt[s] to provide a 
new framework for moving forward.”  Id. at 64. 
32  For Stewart Macaulay’s own review of the evolution of Legal Realism from the old to the new, 
see Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to Be,” 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 365.  See also Erlanger et al., supra note 12 (noting the challenges to a truly interdis-
ciplinary approach to the study of law). 
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Legal Realist scholarship often makes crucial assumptions about the com-
munication of law and the awareness of legal rules when examining the in-
fluence or possible effects of law on behavior.  But this scholarship rarely 
tests that assumption.  Ellickson, for example, sought to bring some “real-
ism” to law and economics’ embrace of the Coase Theorem by interviewing 
real cattle ranchers like those imagined by Coase.33  He reports that, counter 
to the assumption of Coase,“it turns out, perhaps counterintuitively, that le-
gal rules hardly ever influence the settlement of cattle-trespass disputes” 
among the ranchers in his study.34 
We take an approach we term “New Old Realism”: a revival of the 
original Legal Realist ideas from the vantage point of New Realism.  The 
methodology of old Legal Realism has much to offer that informs our study 
of law and legal institutions and our models of human behavior.  Like Lle-
wellyn, we want to look at the law and “[h]ow it has been working.”35  And 
we share his skepticism for the method of teaching that focuses almost ex-
clusively on the parsing of appellate cases.  However, the case studies of 
Old Realism should work side by side with both schools of New Realism: 
the realistic doctrinal work as well as the statistically sophisticated empiri-
cal studies.  Both types of scholarship are richer when informed by, and 
even constrained by, the law as the parties describe it.  We are interested in 
the same subjects that fascinated Ellickson and Macaulay—the people who 
are acting in the shadow of the law.  How do they perceive that shadow?  
How do they talk about it?  Does the law guide and influence their actions 
in the ways that legal scholars assume?  We seek to answer that question by 
focusing on a specific legal rule and how it has been understood by its in-
tended audience. 
II. A CASE FOR STUDY: JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S OPERATING CO. 
Our project examines how the dictates of appellate opinions are un-
derstood on the ground.  For judicial decisions to operate effectively as law, 
lawyers must interpret and transmit them to those whose behavior should be 
governed by the new ruling.  To examine that assumption, we focus our 
study on the impact of one case, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.36  
Jespersen is the type of case that makes its way into both the academic ca-
non and the practitioner playbook.  In this Part, we describe the case, its lit-
 
33  ELLICKSON, supra note 6.  Coase hypothesized that when parties can privately exchange rights 
and face no transaction costs, the efficient allocation of property rights (or liability) will result regardless 
of the original distribution of those rights.  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960).  Parties will respond to the rule by buying (or selling) their rights to the appropriate relative val-
ue to both sides.  Id. at 4–8. 
34  ELLICKSON, supra note 6, at 40. 
35  LLEWELLYN, supra note 20, at 510. 
36  444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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igation history, and its visible impact on the legal academy, law firm prac-
tice, and public media.   
A. The Case: Dispute, Litigation, and Outcome 
In 2001, Harrah’s Operating Company, a major U.S. gaming company, 
adopted a “Personal Best” program37 as part of the company’s attempt to 
make over and upgrade its image.38  As part of this program, women had to 
wear makeup, style their hair, and polish their nails every day consistent 
with a postmakeover photograph.39  Men, for their part, were prohibited 
from wearing makeup and were required to keep their nails clean and hair 
short.40  Darlene Jespersen, a Reno bartender, worked in a Harrah’s casino 
for more than twenty years before she was fired for failing to wear make-
up.41  She filed a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Harrah’s on 
July 6, 2001.42  Two Reno solo practitioners, Kenneth McKenna and Jeffrey 
Dickerson, represented Jespersen in the trial court.  On June 19, 2002, Har-
rah’s counsel moved for summary judgment.43  The first judicial ruling on 
Jespersen’s claim came from Senior District Judge Edward Reed, who 
found, quite incredibly, that grooming requirements could not violate Title 
 
37  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d en banc, 
444 F.3d 1104.  The opinion describes Harrah’s “‘Beverage Department Image Transformation’ pro-
gram” and its stated goal “to create a ‘brand standard of excellence’ throughout Harrah’s operations, 
with an emphasis on guest service positions.”  Id.  The centerpiece of the BDIT program was new ap-
pearance standards called the “Personal Best” program, which was implemented in twenty of Harrah’s 
locations.  Id. 
38  See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. 
Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002) (CV-N-01-0401-ECR-VPC), 2002 WL 32980097 (“Harrah’s imple-
mented the Beverage Department Image Transformation (‘BDIT’) program . . . [as] a comprehensive 
initiative to raise the total service performance of the Harrah’s beverage team . . . .”).  Although our fo-
cus is on the litigation in the federal courts, Jespersen also filed a wrongful discharge suit in Nevada 
state court, where her tort and contract claims were dismissed with little treatment of the issues.  Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., No. CV02-04471 (Nev. Dist.Ct. Oct. 
15, 2002).  The evolution of the litigation, including both the state and federal court processes, is de-
scribed in Dianne Avery and Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the 
New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 45–57 (2007).  
39  See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 108384 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that an image consultant 
gave each woman a makeover and took a postmakeover photograph, which was used as an “appearance 
measurement tool” to which the employee was held “accountable” daily, but did not give men a ma-
keover). 
40  See Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 6, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (CV-N-01-0401-ECR-
VPC), 2003 WL 25859577.  Harrah’s dictated a common uniform for men and women but set forth 
sharply contrasting grooming guidelines.  Men had to keep their hair short while women had to wear 
their hair “down” and “tease[], curl[] or style[] [it] every day.”  Id. at 6.  Men could not wear makeup, 
but women had to wear “face powder, blush and mascara . . . in complimentary colors” and “[l]ip color 
. . . at all times.”  Id. 
41  Id. at 2–7. 
42  Id. 
43  Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 38.  
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VII because they did not involve an immutable characteristic.44  He granted 
summary judgment in favor of Harrah’s.45 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the preeminent gay 
rights litigation organization in the United States, took the lead on Jesper-
sen’s appeal because it saw the case as an opportunity to urge an expansion 
of Title VII to include more claims by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgen-
dered (LGBT) employees.46  Courts had uniformly interpreted Title VII as 
inapplicable to sexual orientation discrimination.47  But, in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII prohibited 
adverse employment decisions based on an employee’s failure to adhere to 
sex stereotypes.48  Gay rights advocates had tried with limited success to use 
Price Waterhouse to argue that an employer illegally discriminated against 
an LGBT employee based on the employee’s failure to comply with sex ste-
reotypes.49  If Lambda Legal could persuade courts to accept that appear-
ance codes based on sex stereotypes were a form of sex discrimination, then 
such claims, which often would be asserted by LGBT employees, could be 
brought under Title VII.50 
 
44  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 
1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).  The details of the lower federal 
court litigation are included in Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Story of Jes-
persen v. Harrah’s: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 120–
24 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).  
45  Jespersen, 280 F.Supp. 2d at 1195. 
46  See Ann Rostow, Lesbian Loses Dress Code Discrimination Suit, DALL. VOICE, Apr. 21, 2006, 
available at http://www.dallasvoice.com/artman/publish/article_1892.php (quoting Lambda Legal law-
yer Jennifer Pizer as saying that the Jespersen case helped push the law on sex stereotyping forward). 
47  See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment 
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 714–15 (2010). 
48  490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989). 
49  See McGinley, supra note 47, at 732–44, 750–57 (explaining that some courts interpret Price Wa-
terhouse to protect gay, lesbian, and transgendered individuals, but others do not); Kimberly A. Yurack-
o, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 616 (2010) 
(concluding that while courts sometimes use language implying that protection could extend to effemi-
nate men and masculine women, they have been largely unwilling to protect gender nonconformists). 
50  As described infra Part III, we conducted in-person interviews to assess the impact of Jespersen.  
(To maintain confidentiality we have chosen not to reveal the names of those interviewed.)  One of our 
interview subjects who had been involved with the litigation at an early stage explained: “The Ninth was 
the Circuit most likely to be receptive . . . you know, to an expansion of the law in the direction of giv-
ing gay and lesbian plaintiffs greater protection against discrimination in the workplace.  There was al-
ready good precedent in the Ninth Circuit.  Those prior cases could provide the necessary building 
blocks for a more robust anti-stereotyping doctrine.  This was a good case with a sympathetic plaintiff.  
It was just a matter of getting the right panel.”  Two of those Ninth Circuit cases are Gerdom v. Conti-
nental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), which struck down weight limits for female 
flight attendants); and Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), which struck down diffe-
rential weight limits for men and women when the limits for women were much stricter.   
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The original three-judge appellate panel was divided on Jespersen’s 
claim.51  All three judges rejected Judge Reed’s immutability theory.52  
However, Judges Wallace Tashima and Barry Silverman concluded that ap-
pearance regulations imposing different requirements on men and women 
were not necessarily discriminatory as a legal matter.  In order to be discri-
minatory, the requirements had to impose a greater burden on one sex than 
on the other.  The majority opinion stated that while unequal burdens would 
be actionable, Jespersen failed to introduce evidence that women faced a 
greater burden than men.53  Judge Sidney Thomas wrote a heated dissent, 
arguing that his colleagues ignored the sex stereotyping and degradation in-
herent in the casino’s policy.54 
In a highly unusual move, the Ninth Circuit reheard Jespersen’s appeal 
en banc.55  A divided eleven-judge en banc panel upheld the three-judge 
panel’s ruling as well as its conclusion that Jespersen failed to offer evi-
dence of an unequal burden imposed by the Personal Best policy.56  The ma-
jority further held that she had failed to prove that the policy involved 
sexual stereotyping, which could have been an independent basis for a via-
ble Title VII claim.57  It marked the first time a federal appeals court stated 
 
51  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
52  Id. at 1080 (explaining that, while early decisions found that appearance standards regulating 
“mutable” characteristics did not discriminate based on sex, “later cases recognized, however, that an 
employer’s imposition of more stringent appearance standards on one sex than the other constitutes sex 
discrimination even where the appearance standards regulate only ‘mutable’ characteristics such as 
weight”). 
53  Id. at 1081–83.  
54  Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Title VII does not make exceptions for particular industries, 
and we should not write them in.  Pervasive discrimination often persists within an industry with excep-
tional tenacity, and the force of law is sometimes required to overcome it.”).  In particular, Judge Tho-
mas faulted the majority for failing to follow the dictates of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  Id. at 1084. 
For a more thorough description of these opinions, see Carbado et al., supra note 44, at 130–32.   
55  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit decided 
6197 cases on the merits from October 2004 to September 2005 but only 15 cases en banc, yielding an 
en banc review rate of less than 0.2%.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.S-1 (2005) (reporting “U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Terminated 
on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending Sep-
tember 30, 2005”).  
56  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  Chief Judge 
Schroeder wrote the majority opinion joined by Judges Rymer, Silverman, Tallman, Clifton, Callahan, 
and Bea.  Id. at 1104–113.  Judge Pregerson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Judges Kozinski, Gra-
ber, and Fletcher, id. at 1113–17, and Judge Kozinski filed a dissenting opinion joined by Judges Graber 
and Fletcher, id. at 1117–18.  A majority of nonrecused judges had voted to grant rehearing en banc on 
May 13, 2005.  409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).  Not all of the Ninth Circuit’s judges sat in this case: the 
court uses a mini-en banc procedure whereby ten randomly selected judges and the circuit chief judge sit 
as the en banc court.  Even though only a subset of judges sits, a majority of all active circuit judges 
must vote to grant en banc review.  See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006); FED. R. APP. P. 35-3. 
57  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12. 
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that an appearance code could violate Title VII if the employer’s policy ste-
reotyped the employee based on sex. 
Most relevant, for our purposes, is what the en banc panel said.  Jes-
persen’s claim of sex discrimination was premised on the notion that it was 
obvious that the burdens imposed on female bartenders were greater than 
those imposed on male bartenders.  She also claimed that requiring women 
(and not men) to wear makeup constituted impermissible sex stereotyp-
ing—that is, requiring women to conform to a stereotype to which men 
were not required to conform.58  The court accepted the premise that it was 
indeed discriminatory for a casino to impose different grooming require-
ments on men and women but only if it were shown by evidence that the 
burdens on one sex were significantly greater than those on the other.  Yet 
Jespersen had not adduced evidence demonstrating the greater burden that 
she was claiming; she had simply asserted it.59  If she had demonstrated the 
differential burden, with concrete evidence, the en banc majority suggested 
that she might have won.60  The dissenters, particularly current Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski, saw the matter differently.  It was obvious, Judge Kozinski 
observed, that imposing a makeup requirement on women and not on men 
created materially different burdens.61  Furthermore, the majority stated that 
there could be a potential cause of action under Title VII if the employer’s 
appearance policy unreasonably stereotyped a person because of sex.62   
One of the most surprising aspects of the case was how Judge Kozinski 
and then-Chief Judge Mary Schroeder came out.  Chief Judge Schroeder, a 
prominent liberal, was part of a majority ruling against a female plaintiff in 
a high-profile employment discrimination case.  (Three of the four women 
judges on the panel voted against Jespersen.)63  Schroeder not only voted 
against an exemplary female employee who was fired for refusing to bend 
to her employer’s stereotype of women but also took a leadership role by 
 
58  Id. at 1112. 
59  The court stated that “none [of the policies’ requirements] on its face places a greater burden on 
one gender . . . .  It is for the most part unisex, . . . [not] adopted to make women bartenders conform to a 
commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.”  Id. at 1109–12. 
60  Id. at 1109–11. 
61  Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
62  Id. at 1111 (majority opinion). 
63  Id. This result is especially surprising in light of empirical studies finding that female circuit 
judges are more receptive to employment discrimination suits claiming gender bias than are their male 
colleagues.  See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010) (finding both direct gender effects in sex discrimination cases in the courts of 
appeals, i.e., that male judges are less likely than female judges to favor the employee, and indirect 
gender effects, i.e., that a male judge is more likely to favor the employee if one of his co-panelists is a 
woman); Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) 
(on file with the authors and the Northwestern University Law Review) (concluding, after a systematic 
consideration of courts of appeals decisions from 1981 to 1996, that female judges were more likely 
than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases claiming gender bias). 
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writing the majority opinion rejecting Jespersen’s claim.  On the other hand, 
Judge Kozinski, one of the most prominent conservative judges in the coun-
try, was the leader of the dissenters.64  Kozinski appeared to put himself in 
Jespersen’s shoes, deciding that it was humiliating to be asked to wear ma-
keup.65   
Chief Judge Schroeder’s decision may have been a strategic one.66  
Based on her prior decisions,67 we would expect her to support a claimant 
like Darlene Jespersen.  Her single vote, however, would not have won the 
case for Jespersen.  And because the majority opinion was issued by an en 
banc court, it would have superseded prior Ninth Circuit law, including an 
important en banc employment discrimination case, also written by Chief 
Judge Schroeder, that had invalidated weight restrictions for female flight 
attendants.68  Thus, realizing the importance of gaining control of the major-
ity opinion, Chief Judge Schroeder likely chose to vote with the majority so 
that she could assign the opinion to herself.  While this meant that Jespersen 
would lose the case, women employees in general would be better off be-
cause Judge Schroeder could craft an opinion that not only preserved the 
existing protections against gender discrimination but perhaps even ad-
vanced those protections.69   
The shape of the final opinion in Jespersen suggests the validity of a 
strategic theory of Chief Judge Schroeder’s behavior.  The majority opinion 
 
64  Judge Kozinski is known for his free market views, which presumably include a high degree of 
deference to employers trying to figure out how to run their businesses.  See Shikha Dalmia, Searching 
for Alex Kozinski, REASON, July 2006, at 41, available at http://reason.com/archives/2006/07/01/
searching-for-alex-kozinski. 
65  Judge Kozinski wrote: “Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, 
mascara and lipstick while on the bench.  Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime burdensome and 
demeaning; it would interfere with my job performance.”  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting).  Conversely, Chief Judge Schroeder also may have put herself in Jespersen’s shoes and de-
cided that being asked to wear a minimal amount of makeup was not a big deal—that, in the fight for 
gender equality, this was not a battle worth winning.  Id. at 1109 (majority opinion) (concluding that the 
makeup “requirements . . . , on their face, are not more onerous for one gender than the other”). 
66  For a discussion of strategic voting to influence opinion content, see VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET 
AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 
(2006), and FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL 
GAME (2000). 
67  See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc); see also Mary 
M. Schroeder, Compassion on Appeal, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 48–51 (1990) (arguing that statutes with a 
compassionate purpose, like employment discrimination laws, should be interpreted with compassion). 
68  The case was Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, which struck down weight restrictions for female 
flight attendants more than two decades earlier.  692 F.2d 602.  The Jespersen panel relied heavily on 
this case for its conclusion that appearance standards could constitute sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII.  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2004). 
69  None of the Jespersen judges spoke with us about how they reached their decisions, but many 
people involved in the litigation shared their views on what might have been behind the judges’ actions.  
Specifically, several respondents suggested that while Schroeder’s sympathies were probably with Jes-
persen, she knew she was going to be in the minority if she voted for Jespersen.  
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held that Darlene Jespersen lost because she had not produced enough evi-
dence of an unequal burden on women, but it then proceeded to lay out a 
road map for future plaintiffs.70  More importantly, the opinion also added 
clarity to the emerging law on stereotyping.  Chief Judge Schroeder, in dic-
ta, constructed a stereotyping claim for discrimination cases involving ap-
pearance discrimination: plaintiffs (at least in the Ninth Circuit) can now 
bring claims challenging appearance policies that, as an objective matter, 
stereotype either men or women because of their sex.  Schroeder explained 
that “[i]f a grooming standard imposed on either sex amounts to impermiss-
ible stereotyping, something this record does not establish, a plaintiff of ei-
ther sex may challenge that requirement under Price Waterhouse.”71  
Moreover, Jespersen did not offer any evidence that Harrah’s makeup poli-
cy was motivated by a desire to stereotype women.72  As examples of the 
type of sexual stereotyping that could support a cause of action under Title 
VII, the majority focused on appearance policies that unduly sexualize the 
claimant and, as a result, either subject employees to higher risk of sexual 
harassment or lead to unequal treatment of employees based on sex.73   
Jespersen appeared to change the rules of the game, significantly in-
creasing the risk of litigation losses for casinos.74  Casino cocktail servers, 
 
70  See, e.g., Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight Against Barbie-
fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 313 (2007) (stating that the majority pre-
sented an evidentiary roadmap for future challenges to gender-based dress codes and that the dissenting 
opinions and the majority opinions taken together “moved the law forward in ways that may make future 
challenges to stereotypical dress and grooming rules easier to win”); Recent Case, Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), 120 HARV. L. REV. 651, 654 (2006) (noting 
that the Ninth Circuit suggested that a showing can be made in the future of unequal burdens and stating 
that plaintiffs can and should make this showing). 
71  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
72  Id. at 1112. 
73  See McGinley, supra note 18, at 270–82 (concluding that hiring exclusively female cocktail serv-
ers and dressing them in sexually explicit costumes likely violates Title VII after Jespersen); Pizer, su-
pra note 70, at 308–13 (pointing to the language in the case and concluding that there may exist a good 
cause of action for discrimination by female cocktail servers wearing skimpy outfits under Title VII af-
ter Jespersen).  We should note that not every discussion of Jespersen in the academic literature attaches 
importance to the portion of the opinion that suggests that outfits assigned according to gender stereo-
types might fall afoul of Title VII.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF 
APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 120–22 (2010) (focusing instead on the unequal burdens portion of the 
opinion rather than the sex stereotyping portion).  The dress-code-discrimination aspect of the case is of 
greatest importance only in those industries where employers mandate the kinds of outfits that implicate 
issues of stereotyping, e.g., the casino industry.   
74  At a conference held by the Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy soon after the release of the 
final Jespersen opinion, a senior casino lawyer told us that he and others in the casino industry were 
concerned about the implications of the case for categories of employees other than bartenders, given 
certain language in Chief Judge Schroeder’s opinion.  Apparently, these questions were extensively dis-
cussed at a conference of entertainment industry managers and lawyers that occurred soon after the opi-
nion came down.  An interviewee who was high in the management chain at Harrah’s also told us that, 
in the interviewee’s opinion, it was ridiculous to hold Darlene Jespersen to the makeup requirement.  
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for example, wear highly sexualized uniforms that should support “easy” 
claims.75  After Jespersen, women casino employees could simply introduce 
financial records, their own testimony, or an expert witness to prove that the 
dress and makeup requirements being imposed on them but not men were 
costly.76  Casinos could overcome this evidence only by proving that the 
appearance requirements were necessary or integral to the job at hand and 
to the essence of the particular business: that is, that the appearance re-
quirements were a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).77  Howev-
er, courts traditionally have been willing to grant only the narrowest of 
BFOQ exceptions.78  
B. The Impact: Popular Press, Legal Scholarship, and Law Firm Alerts 
The Jespersen opinions grabbed an extraordinary level of notice from 
law professors and students, journalists, and law firms.79  Hundreds of law 
journal pages were written analyzing it.80  And the en banc court’s opinions 
quickly became part of standard teaching materials in courses examining 
gender discrimination in the workplace.81  As the nature of employment dis-
                                                                                                                           
This interviewee, however, believed that it was important to have makeup and other sex-specific re-
quirements for cocktail servers.  
75  Dianne Avery, The Great American Makeover: The Sexing Up and Dumbing Down of Women’s 
Work After Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc., 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 320–21 (2008) 
(“Even the Ninth Circuit is not likely to tolerate under Title VII an employer policy that makes baristas 
wear negligees in order to have the job of selling steamed coffee at a roadside stand.  Such a policy, as-
suming the employer meets the numerosity requirements of Title VII, would signal an intent to make the 
employee ‘sexually provocative, and tending to stereotype women as sex objects.’  Dress codes mandat-
ing that female employees wear sexy, revealing tops, short skirts, and high heels should be the ‘easy’ 
cases under existing Title VII doctrine, whether the theory is that such dress rules demean and objectify 
women or that they expose women to sexual harassment from supervisors, co-workers, and customers.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
76  For a discussion of possible future litigation, see Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 
1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), supra note 70, at 654 (noting that “the court left open the possibility that 
a future plaintiff who submits more evidence of unequal burdens may succeed in a Title VII action” and 
describing how plaintiffs could prove that makeup policies impose unequal economic, physical, and 
psychological burdens, any one of which would be sufficient under the court’s language).  
77  See McGinley, supra note 18; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Ex-
plaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004). 
78  Appearance requirements for airline attendants, for example, do not fit the category.  Southwest 
Airlines famously lost its argument that it needed to be able to do gender-specific hiring so as to main-
tain its image as the “love airline” because the judge found that sexual titillation was tangential to the 
business in question.  Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also 
Yuracko, supra note 18, at 87274 (discussing Wilson v. Southwest).   
79  The district court decision itself was the basis of academic attention.  See David B. Cruz, Making 
Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240 (2004).   
80  As of November 2010, more than 150 published articles have cited the case.  Interest peaked 
when the en banc opinion was released in 2006.   
81  See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 82–96 (5th ed. 2009); ROBERT BELTON ET AL., 2008 SUPPLEMENT TO 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 37–52 
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crimination has changed over the years from a focus on explicit and overt 
animus to more subtle forms of hostility, appearance issues have provided 
especially fertile ground for broader debates about the directions that dis-
crimination law should take.  In particular, the question of whether the law 
protects against stereotyping and discrimination based on “mutable charac-
teristics” dominates discussion.  Moreover, appearance policies are salient 
to the debates over whether there should be protections against sexual 
orientation discrimination.  The Jespersen case brought aspects of all of 
these issues in front of one of the most important courts in the country, and 
unsurprisingly, academics reacted with great interest.  For example, a com-
parison of the number of law journal citations to each of the opinions pub-
lished by a federal circuit court of appeals during the year 2006, showed 
Jespersen to be one of only five cases to have received over fifty citations 
as of January 1, 2009.82  In other words, it garnered more interest than cases 
on abortion, the death penalty, gay marriage, and so on.  At a minimum, it 
was the most prominent employment discrimination case written during that 
three-year period.   
The case also generated considerable attention in the press, both before 
and after the decision.83  The media’s interest is explained by three consid-
erations.  First, the issue was straightforward and understandable: Is it 
gender discrimination for an employer to mandate that its female employees 
wear makeup?  For some people, Jespersen symbolized the absurdity of an-
tidiscrimination laws by encouraging litigation over trivial issues.  For oth-
ers, the biased mandate that women wear makeup, with no similar 
requirement for men, demonstrated the willingness of employers and socie-
ty more generally to constrain and discipline women while allowing men 
wide latitude in their workplace choices.  Second, the case involved a casi-
no.  If a casino, which trades on a highly sexualized, make-believe envi-
ronment, cannot require its female bartenders to wear makeup, does that 
mean that other employers cannot require their female cocktail servers to 
wear skimpy outfits, high heels, and so on?  Third, the case had an under-
current of conflict between the interests of the gay community and the 
women’s rights movement.  The gay rights group litigating the case, Lamb-
                                                                                                                           
(2008); SUSAN GROVER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 
(2011); STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 504–13 (4th ed. 
2008); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 347–53 
(7th ed. 2008); Carbado et al., supra note 44, at 105. 
82  The one appeals court excluded from this comparison was the Federal Circuit, which has a large-
ly specialized docket.  Summary data is on file with the Northwestern University Law Review.  For 
background on the methodology used, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Su-
preme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004).   
83  See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Your Appearance, Good or Bad, Can Affect Size of Your Paycheck, 
USA TODAY, July 20, 2005, at 1B; Bob Egelko, Court OKs Sex-Based Grooming Standards, S.F. 
CHRON., Apr. 15, 2006, at B1; Carol Kleiman, Judges Embrace Mandatory Makeup, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 
2005, § 3, at 2; Henry Weinstein, Court Rules Bartender Was Justly Fired for Refusing to Wear Ma-
keup, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, at A18. 
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da Legal, saw it as an opportunity to move the law in a favorable direction 
for LGBT claimants.  The prominent women’s rights groups, on the other 
hand, took a back seat in both the litigation and the debates in the press.84  
And when the case finally came down, the majority opinion was written by 
a prominent, liberal, female judge.  And with current Chief Judge Kozinski, 
Chief Judge Schroeder’s loudest (and most articulate) conservative col-
league, in dissent, the case made great legal theater.85   
Finally, employment and labor lawyers responded to the case in bar 
and industry journals and in their public communications to clients (and 
presumably with greater frequency in private communications).86  Numer-
ous law firm client memos were immediately propagated, announcing that 
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, had issued an opinion tackling appearance 
discrimination.  Most of those memos, though noting that Darlene Jespersen 
had lost her case, cautioned employers that there was language in the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion that should cause them to be extremely careful with their 
dress and appearance policies.87  The title of one memo cautioned clients: 
Reconsider Your Grooming and Appearance Policies for Possible Gender 
 
84  Lambda Legal represented Jespersen before the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel and in the en 
banc rehearing.  Several regional women’s rights groups filed amicus briefs in support of Jespersen, but 
national women’s rights groups were notably absent.  For a discussion of women’s rights groups’ in-
volvement in the case, see Carbado et al., supra note 44, at 124–27. 
85  Apart from press attention, the case even found its way into a documentary on American attitudes 
toward appearance involving, among others, Paris Hilton.  AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL (Darryl Roberts 
2007).  
86  See, e.g., Ellen M. Martin, Evolving Theories of Sex, Race, and Color Discrimination Under Title 
VII, in 2 37TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 441 (2008); Brent A. Olson, Gender Discrim-
ination § 13:11, in MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, FORMATION AND 
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES (2009); Gregory J. Kamer & Edwin A. Keller Jr., Give Me $5 Chips, a Jack 
and Coke—Hold the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Appearance Issues in the Gaming Industry, 
7 GAMING L. REV. 335, 335 (2003) (advising employers on how to avoid “the potential legal minefields 
gaming establishments face when working to create a particular image or theme for their casino and sur-
rounding services”); E. Fredrick Preis Jr. et al., Employment in Gaming: Recent Discrimination Issues, 
8 GAMING L. REV. 89 (2004). 
87  Gambling with Appearances: Employer’s Makeup Rule Draws Sex Discrimination Suit, EMP. L. 
BRIEFING (Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman P.S.C., Indianapolis, Ind.), July/Aug. 2005, at 35, 
http://www.hallrender.com/library/newsletters/49/ELBja05.pdf; Female Bartender Loses Her Challenge 
to Casino’s Requirement that She Must Wear Makeup, EMP. L. ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP, Bos., 
Mass.), Aug./Sept. 2006, at 57, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/ELA_
08002006.pdf; Sex Discrimination Claims, EMP. L. COUNSELING & TRAINING TIP OF THE MONTH 
(Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, N.Y.) Aug. 2009, http://www.proskauer.com/news/detail.aspx?
news=3065; Hair-Dos, Tattoos, and Body Piercings: Is Your Dress Code Lawful?, LAB. & EMP. L. 
ALERT (Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, Or.), Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?
Show=2361; Ninth Circuit Finds that Dress and Grooming Standards Policy Did Not Violate Title VII’s 
Prohibitions Against Gender Discrimination and “Sex Stereotyping,” BRIEFING: LAB. & EMP. PRAC. 
(Winston & Strawn LLP, Chi., Ill.), Apr. 2006, http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/
DressAndGroomingStandards.pdf. 
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Discrimination, Ninth Circuit Suggests.88  Another said, Ninth Circuit 
Upholds Make-Up RequirementBut Cautions Employers.89   
C. Theoretical Model for Predicted Impact 
If judicial opinions matter, then we would expect the Jespersen opi-
nions to be consequential in Nevada for several reasons.  First, the factual 
focus, appearance standards in casinos, is highly salient in the local com-
munity, in which casinos are the dominant industry and sex and sexuality 
are treated as commodities.  Second, the court acted in the most powerful 
way possible by hearing the case en banc.  With more judges and rulings 
than any other court, the Ninth Circuit is the largest appellate court in the 
country, and it covers a broad swath of the population.  Hence, it would not 
be surprising if an ordinary panel opinion were overlooked.  But if any 
court of appeals decision gets attention, then one by a divided en banc panel 
with a long majority opinion and two dissents, including a very colorful 
one, should be noted.  Third, the opinion broke new ground by laying out a 
way to meaningfully expand employee rights.  Fourth, the language sent a 
clear signal to potential litigants that they could qualify for class action cer-
tification, damages, or both, sufficient to motivate entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.  
Although the Jespersen opinion appears to have had a measurable im-
pact on legal scholarship, law school teaching, popular press accounts, and 
practitioners’ writing, a change in casino workplace policies (or at least a 
review of those policies) and litigation challenging those policies would be 
the most direct measure of an effect on everyday life.  But at least initially, 
the casinos did nothing, and no employees complained.90  Legal academics, 
the judges on the Ninth Circuit, the employment discrimination practition-
ers, and Lambda Legal all might have been wrong in attaching so much im-
portance to the reasoning in the opinion.  The casinos’ failure to respond is 
unexpected because the conventional wisdom on legal advice in the wake of 
ambiguous court decisions suggests that attorneys typically push their 
clients toward overcorrecting to protect against potential legal risk.  It is in 
the interests of lawyers to exaggerate legal risks both to enhance their im-
portance to the client and also to give the lawyers more work to do.91  At 
 
88  Paul Trimmer, Reconsider Your Grooming and Appearance Policies for Possible Gender Dis-
crimination, Ninth Circuit Suggests, LAB. & EMP. L. ALERT (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, 
San Diego, Cal.), May 17, 2006, http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/Labor_Emp_060517.htm. 
89  Ninth Circuit Upholds Make-up RequirementBut Cautions Employers, FENWICK EMP. BRIEF 
(Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain View, Cal.), May 10, 2006, http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/
publications/Employment/EB_05-10-06.pdf.  
90  See infra Part IV. 
91  Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful 
Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 74–77 (1992).  For other suggestions that lawyers overestimate 
legal risks, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 529–32 (2003), and Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing 
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least within the context of the Las Vegas casino industry, however, reality 
seems to point in the opposite direction: lawyers on both sides are underes-
timating the implications of the relevant case law. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The study in this Article examines how Jespersen’s reasoning changed 
the behavior of legal actors on the ground.  For our lens, we used how 
people talk about the relevance of changes in the law.  Our data consists of 
subjects’ stories about their experiences with the Las Vegas casino industry.  
The interviews reveal the perceived role law plays in their world as well as 
their view of the contradictions and complications posed by the specific en-
vironment in which they work and live.  These stories are valuable as 
sources of insight into how people talk and think about a phenomenon.  The 
stories, though, do not necessarily tell us how these same people act. 
A. The Interviews 
From 2008 to 2010, we conducted more than one hundred in-person in-
terviews in the Las Vegas area.92  The goal was to talk to people in three 
different roles: employees (potential litigants), lawyers (on both the defense 
and plaintiff sides), and judges (in both state and federal courts).  We inter-
viewed seventy casino employees,93 twenty-seven lawyers, and ten judges.  
We also spoke with a small number of government officials and thirteen 
human resources personnel.   
We identified subjects through the “snowball” method: our initial con-
tacts yielded subsequent contacts.94  This technique can produce a sample 
selection problem because subjects will be people known to other subjects.  
The risk of bias in the lawyer sample is small because the Nevada employ-
ment law bar is itself quite small.95  Employment lawyers tend to know each 
                                                                                                                           
the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 375 
(1997).  Cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 92–95 (2007) (discussing the excessive risk 
aversion frequently displayed by lawyers for the government, such as those at the CIA). 
92  We obtained approval from the institutional review boards of each of our home institutions for 
this human subject study. 
93  Of this group, the largest subsample was of female cocktail servers; we spoke to twenty-seven. 
94  At the end of every interview, we asked each subject whom we ought to contact for additional in-
terviews, which produces a snowball, or multiplication, effect on the sample.  Snowball (or chain-
referral) sampling is a nonprobability method that makes it easier, quicker, and cheaper to identify sub-
jects but may not reflect a representative cross section of the population.  See generally James S. Cole-
man, Relational Analysis: The Study of Social Organizations with Survey Methods, 17 HUMAN ORG. 28 
(1958) (introducing this methodology); Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Prob-
lems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 10 SOC. METHODS & RES. 141 (1981).  We used this 
method because of the difficulty of identifying interviewees and obtaining interviews from our target 
population.  Referrals acted as a means to identify current or former casino employees and as a way to 
gain access to casino employees and employment discrimination lawyers.   
95  A search by librarians at the UNLV Wiener–Rogers Law Library of the databases of federal and 
state filings demonstrated that while many firms having Nevada offices list employment law as one of 
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other, and our subjects were highly representative of the characteristics of 
employment attorneys practicing in Las Vegas.  The same can be said of the 
sample of judges.  Thus, we are confident that we have a representative 
sample of lawyers and judges.  On the other hand, the relevant employee 
population is sizeable; hence, any method of selection other than random 
selection with an unbiased response rate poses a risk of bias.   
Our initial attempts at asking for interviews from casino employees 
met with little success.  No one was willing to talk to us; their immediate 
reaction was that we were “trouble.”  One female bartender whom we at-
tempted to interview at an early stage (in the mid-afternoon) was kind 
enough to tell one of us:  
Honey, let me give you some advice.  You aren’t going to get anyone to talk to 
you unless you are spending money gambling.  Otherwise, even if one of us 
wants to talk to you, it looks suspicious.  And another thing: You can’t find out 
anything coming here in the afternoon.  You need to be out at night and that 
too at the clubs at places like the Hard Rock.  That is where the action is.  It 
isn’t here. 
Lacking the expertise and income necessary to be interesting as customers 
(to say nothing of our inability to stay up late enough to go to the clubs at 
the appropriate hours), the enterprise seemed doomed to failure.96   
Unexpectedly, teaching gave us a means to meet and interview em-
ployees.97  As part of the research project, two of the authors taught a class 
at the UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law on dress and appearance reg-
ulation in the casino industry.  We discussed our preliminary findings with 
our students.  The class was made up of twenty-five students, many of 
whom had worked in the industry as dancers, models, servers, managers, 
executives, or auditors.  The rest had a high degree of familiarity with the 
workings of the casino business.  Every day, as we taught our intensive one-
week class, which met for five hours a day, the students would bring their 
experiences to bear on our discussions of employment discrimination juri-
sprudence and theory—usually to show us how our understandings of the 
casino industry were flawed in light of their personal experiences and those 
                                                                                                                           
their specialties in MartindaleHubbell.com, only twenty-two of the listed firms and individuals had ap-
peared in employment litigation in federal or state court in Nevada from 2000 to 2010.  In addition, in 
the course of our interviews, many of which were with lawyers and judges, we always asked our sub-
jects for suggestions as to others in the employment area whom we should interview.  The same short 
list of names arose repeatedly. 
96  The author of an outstanding ethnography of the casino industry took jobs working in casinos in 
order to gain insights to this world.  See JEFFREY J. SALLAZ, THE LABOR OF LUCK: CASINO CAPITALISM 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA (2009). 
97  The class also provided another means of reaching out to the local legal community: Nevada at-
torneys and others working in the business spoke to our class about the gaming industry.  Those guest 
lecturers, in turn, gave us increased access to these lawyers as well as their contacts, who were generally 
willing to help us once they realized that the issues we were interested in discussing were innocuous 
from their perspective. 
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of their friends and family.  In addition, because part of the assignment for 
the class involved the students’ observations of employment practices in 
two contrasting settings (e.g., a smaller local casino compared to a large ca-
sino on the Las Vegas Strip), they sometimes invited us to go along on their 
observation trips.  The students introduced us to employees who agreed to 
participate in the study.  In the end we were able to speak to a wide variety 
of people who were working in or were aware of the casino industry.  
Moreover, the effect of any selection bias would be expected to undermine 
our hypothesis that Jespersen did not affect behavior because the employees 
whom we interviewed (casino workers seeking law degrees and their 
friends and families) would be more likely than other employees to believe 
that court decisions affect behavior.  
We conducted the interviews without a fixed set of questions but in-
stead began by explaining the Jespersen decision and asking for the sub-
ject’s view of its effects on the local community.98  Our subsequent 
questions encouraged respondents to tell their stories.  The interviews 
ranged from roughly a half hour to two hours.99  We conducted all but a 
handful of our interviews with at least two of the investigators present be-
cause each author brought different perspectives to the topic.  Given the ini-
tial reluctance and suspicion we had already encountered, we also decided 
at the outset not to tape any of the interviews and instead to take handwrit-
ten notes.  Even with multiple sets of notes, though, the quotations are not 
always verbatim. 
In Part III, we report on the common themes we perceived in the narra-
tives.  Our impressions are necessarily subjective.  Our interest is in report-
ing patterns in the ways in which the various individuals in the industry talk 
about law and, specifically, how they talk about a case considered important 
by legal academics and the national employment bar.  Some of our inter-
viewees may not have been completely candid with us, but they generally 
appeared comfortable and forthcoming, especially after fifteen minutes or 
so of discussion.  Even if they were spinning a story, our interest was in 
whether there were common themes in the spinning.100  In addition, we were 
 
98  We formally began each interview with a statement about the subject’s rights of confidentiality 
and anonymity, repeating information included in our oral and written communication with them prior 
to the interview. 
99  On average, the employee interviews tended to be on the shorter side (under an hour), whereas all 
but a handful of the lawyer and judge interviews lasted for more than an hour.  This was at least partially 
a function of location and structure because the process of making appointments for the interviews with 
lawyers and judges was more involved, and the interviews themselves were almost all conducted in the 
offices of the respondents. 
100  For methodology, we drew from the work of legal anthropologist John Conley.  See, e.g., Lissa 
L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate 
Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 768–69 (2011) (using an interview-based method to study the 
diversity of corporate boards); John M. Conley, Tales of Diversity: Lawyers Narratives of Racial Equity 
in Law Firms, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 831 (2006) (using the ethnographical method to study law firm 
diversity).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 710 
interested in whether the various respondents would recount common 
myths, stories, or vignettes. 
B. The Community 
Almost all of our interviews were focused on the implications of the 
Jespersen case for the casino industry in Las Vegas.  Las Vegas has the 
largest casino industry in the world and is within the jurisdiction of the 
Ninth Circuit.101  Thus, the impact of the case was most likely to be felt 
there.   
A handful of idiosyncrasies about the Las Vegas legal market are 
worth noting.  Although Las Vegas is one of the nation’s largest cities, with 
a metropolitan population close to two million, its legal market is underde-
veloped relative to other major American cities.102  Few large national firms 
have offices there, due in part to the State Bar Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which made it difficult, although not impossible, to open a 
branch office in Nevada.103  Most of the local law firms are small; twenty-
 
101  For background on the casino industry in Las Vegas, see CHRISTINA BRINKLEY, WINNER TAKES 
ALL: STEVE WYNN, KIRK KERKORIAN, GARY LOVEMAN, AND THE RACE TO OWN LAS VEGAS (2008).  
On the dominance of Las Vegas in the casino industry in the United States and abroad, see Ronald M. 
Pavalko, Casino Gambling: Competing with Other Forms of Entertainment, in INDUSTRY STUDIES 196–
97 (Larry L. Duetsch ed., 2002).  
102  For population statistics for Las Vegas city (ranked twenty-eighth in 2009) and the metropolitan 
area (ranked forty-seventh in 2009), see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT 
POPULATION FOR INCORPORATED PLACES OVER 100,000, RANKED BY JULY 1, 2009 POPULATION: APRIL 
1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/tables/SUB-EST2009-01.xls (last visited 
May 18, 2011), and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF 
METROPOLITAN AND MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009, http://www.
census.gov/popest/metro/tables/2009/CBSA-EST2009-01.xls (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  According to 
the American Bar Association, Nevada in 2009 had 6395 lawyers, or 0.5% of the country’s 1.18 million 
attorneys.  See AM. BAR ASS’N MARKET RESEARCH DEP’T, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE 
(2009), http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/2009_NATL_LAWYER_by_State.pdf.  
On a per capita basis, Nevada has 2.4 attorneys for every 1000 people.  The national average is 3.8 at-
torneys per 1000 people.  Thus, the national rate of lawyers per capita is fifty percent higher than the 
Nevada per capita.  Compare id., with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT 
POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 
2009, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2009-01.xls (last visited May 18, 2011) [he-
reinafter ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES] (calculated by 
dividing the attorney population of Nevada and the United States with the population of Nevada and the 
United States, respectively).  
103  See Mike Fimea, Firm Battles Nevada Rule on Names, ARIZ. BUS. GAZETTE, June 24, 1999, at 
BG1 (describing Nevada Supreme Court Rule 199 which barred out-of-state law firms from using the 
names of lawyers who were not licensed to practice in Nevada in the firms’ name).  But see Michel v. 
Bare, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Nev. 2002) (enjoining the enforcement of part of Rule 199 on the 
ground that the rule impermissibly intruded on lawyers’ First Amendment rights). Within the last few 
years, several National Law Journal top 250 firms, including Greenberg Traurig, Holland & Hart, and 
Ogletree Deakins, have opened small offices in Las Vegas, typically by acquiring existing firms.  See, 
e.g., Pair of Law Firms Announce Merger Plan, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 28, 2008, at 2D (reporting 
that Holland & Hart LLP would merge with Hale Lane Peek Dennison and Howard P.C.).  This may 
lead to or result from a change in the legal culture—probably a bit of both. 
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five lawyers is considered a big firm.104  Our interviews demonstrated that 
the plaintiffs’ bar is smaller than that of comparably sized cities and is 
composed mainly of solo practitioners.  Class action practice appears to be 
rare, at least in the employment law area.  The immaturity of the local legal 
market may be due to the absence of an in-state law school until 1998 when 
the William S. Boyd School of Law, named for a major casino owner, was 
opened at UNLV.  Higher education in general is also less developed in 
Nevada than in some surrounding states, which may also affect the nature 
of legal practice.105  
Finally, perhaps the most sophisticated lawyers in the Nevada legal 
community are those who practice before the State Gaming Control Board 
and the Nevada Gaming Commission, which are arguably the most power-
ful entities in the state.  The Gaming Commission has the power to grant 
and revoke gaming licenses, and it strictly regulates businesses that hold 
gaming licenses.  The Gaming Control Board is an enforcement agency that 
conducts investigations and brings charges before the Nevada Gaming 
Commission.106  
 
104  According to May 2010 data, the average size of the twenty-five largest Nevada firms is twenty-
seven lawyers.  See Ulf Bucholz, The List: Law Firms, IN BUS. LAS VEGAS, July 16–22, 2010, at 12–13 
(reporting results from a survey of firms); see also NEV. LEGAL NEWS, NEVADA LEGAL DIRECTORY (Ju-
ly 2010) (listing by name attorneys in firms with at least two attorneys). The biggest firm, Lionel Sawy-
er & Collins P.C., has sixty-eight attorneys in Nevada.  LIONEL SAWYER, http://www.lionelsawyer.com/
index.cfm?page_id=5 (last visited May 18, 2011).  Fourteen firms had more than twenty-five lawyers in 
2010.  Bucholz, supra, at 12. 
105  According to the U.S. Department of Education, Nevada has twenty-one degree-granting institu-
tions and branches (including public, not-for-profit, and for-profit institutions), or 0.79 per 100,000 resi-
dents, which is lower than neighboring Utah’s thirty-eight (1.36 per 100,000) and Arizona’s seventy-five 
(1.14 per 100,000).  Compare NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2009, 
at tbl.266, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_266.asp, with ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, supra note 102 (calculated by dividing the number of 
degree-granting institutions by the population of each state).  Fewer than one-quarter of Las Vegas resi-
dents twenty-five and older have a bachelor’s degree or higher.  DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, su-
pra, at tbl.14, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_014.asp (last visited May 18, 2011).  
The Las Vegas metropolitan area ranks forty-seventh out of fifty-one metropolitan areas with popula-
tions greater than one million.  Id.  
106  Gaming is tightly regulated in Nevada.  See STATE GAMING CONTROL BD. & NEV. GAMING 
COMM’N, GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA: AN UPDATE . . . (July 2006), available at 
http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/gaming_regulation_nevada.pdf (providing a history and update on 
gaming regulation in Nevada).  The State Gaming Control Board is an administrative agency of the State 
of Nevada charged with the administration and enforcement of the gaming laws of Nevada.  See NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 463.030, 463.140 (2010) (regulating gaming control and licensing).  The gaming laws are 
set forth in Title 41 of the Nevada Revised Statutes and the Regulations of the Nevada Gaming Com-
mission.  The Nevada Gaming Commission has the power to limit, condition, suspend, or revoke a gam-
ing license or fine any person for any cause deemed reasonable.  Id. § 463.310(4)(a)–(d).  The Nevada 
Gaming Control Board is authorized by statute to observe the conduct of licensees to ensure that gaming 
operations are not conducted in an unsuitable manner, id. § 463.1405(1); Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 
5.040 (2010), and to conduct appropriate investigations to determine whether there have been violations 
of the gaming laws.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.310(1).  
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The state and federal judiciaries also are distinctive in terms of compo-
sition and process.  State judges are elected, and casino contributions and 
endorsements are perceived as crucial to winning an election.107  Federal 
judges obviously are not elected, but Senator Harry Reid is credited with 
playing a particularly important role in most appointments.108  Women play 
an increasingly prominent role on the state bench in Nevada, as they have in 
other states, but they have not kept pace on the federal bench.109  Racial mi-
norities are underrepresented on both state and federal courts.110  Approx-
imately 40% of the Las Vegas federal judiciary belongs to the Church of the 
Latter Day Saints (LDS), even though members of the LDS Church make 
up slightly less than 10% of the population of the city.111  In many states, in-
 
107  All state judges in Nevada are chosen in nonpartisan elections.  Judicial Selection in the States: 
Nevada, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?
state=NV.  For investigative reporting on casino contributions to Nevada judicial campaigns, see, for 
example, Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They’re Playing with a Stacked 
Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at A1 (discussing the influence of elected judiciaries on judges 
in Las Vegas); Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11, 
11–18 (discussing several states’ experiences with elected judiciaries).  Nevada ranked eighth in judicial 
campaign contributions, but in 2010, its citizens considered a ballot measure to move to merit selection, 
which was supported by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Opinion, Take 
Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at WK9.  Nevada voters rejected the referendum with 
58% voting against merit selection and to retain direct election of state judges.  Doug McMurdo, Voters 
Reject Changing Judge Selection, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 3, 2010, at 7B. 
108  See, e.g., Tony Batt & Ed Vogel, Senate OKs Sandoval for Federal Bench, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., 
Oct. 25, 2005, at 2B (noting that President Bush nominated Sandoval for a federal district court position 
after receiving a recommendation from Senator Reid, who, under the Bush Administration, had the op-
portunity to select every fourth nominee); Steve Tetreault & Carri Geer Thevenot, Judicial Pick Con-
firmed, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 6, 2010, at 2B (crediting Senator Reid with moving the appointment of 
Gloria Navarro to a federal judgeship quickly); Carri Geer Thevenot, Reid List Could Be Diverse, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 28, 2009, at 1B ( “As the senior Democrat in Nevada’s congressional delegation, 
Reid has the privilege of recommending candidates for the state’s political patronage jobs while a Dem-
ocrat occupies the White House.”). 
109  See Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales, A.B.A. J., July 2010, at 37, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tipping_the_scales (examining the increasing number of 
women on state courts in the South); Judicial Biographies Database, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,  http://www.
fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/export.html (last visited May 18, 2011) (listing biographies of all federal 
judges and revealing that 20% of sitting federal district judges are women whereas only 10% of federal 
judges in Nevada); Statistics: 2010 Representation of United States State Court Women Judges,  NAT’L 
ASS’N OF WOMEN JUDGES (2010), http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2010.asp (reporting 
that 30% of Nevada state judges are women compared to 26% of all state judges).  
110  See AM. BAR ASS’N, DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES (4th ed. 2008); Judicial Biographies Da-
tabase, supra note 109 (listing members of racial minorities serving as judges and revealing that 16% of 
federal district judges are racial minorities whereas only 10% in Nevada are (the only female judge is 
also a minority)). 
111  The Federal Judicial Center does not report religious affiliation of judges. The authors collected 
the religious affiliation data from various secondary sources, including newspaper reports from the time 
of nomination to biographies listing volunteer activities.  See Religious and Political Affiliations of Ne-
vada’s Federal District Court Judges and Magistrate Judges (June 21, 2011) (on file with Northwestern 
University Law Review).  Where we could not clearly ascertain religion, we treated the judge as not 
Mormon.  Based on informal conversations, we suspect our count is an underestimate.  For statistics on 
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cluding neighboring California, state employment discrimination remedies 
are more attractive than federal remedies, but Nevada state law offers no 
greater protection than federal law.112  Thus, plaintiffs may find that, be-
cause they are bringing a federal claim, federal court may be a more appeal-
ing forum for employment discrimination claims.  Employment 
discrimination claimants may also prefer federal district court because it 
channels most employment discrimination suits through an innovative preli-
tigation, magistrate-supervised mediation process in which a federal magi-
strate judge sits down with the parties, evaluates evidence, and provides the 
litigants with the magistrate’s sense of how their case is likely to fare.113 
Government lawyers and legal reform organizations who might have 
an interest in employment cases, particularly those seeking widespread 
changes in industry practices, are generally absent from Nevada.  The 
EEOC, the federal agency charged with policing antidiscrimination law, has 
had little or no presence in Las Vegas until very recently and even now has 
only a minimal presence.114  Most national legal reform organizations such 
as NAACP LDF, Lambda Legal, and the ACLU have their main regional 
offices in Los Angeles or San Francisco.  Whereas the Nevada affiliate of 
the ACLU has grown rapidly over the past fifteen years, only two perma-
nent paid lawyers are on staff.115  The ACLU of Nevada is the “largest and 
most active” nongovernmental body in the state dedicated to protecting civ-
il rights and civil liberties.116 
                                                                                                                           
the Mormon church in Las Vegas, see Las Vegas Mormon Temple, http://www.onlinenevada.org/Las_
Vegas_Mormon_Temple (last visited May 18, 2011). 
112  In Nevada, plaintiffs may file a sex discrimination suit with the Nevada Equal Rights Commis-
sion.  Available remedies under the statute include injunctive relief and backpay, but do not include 
compensatory and punitive damages.  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233.170–233.180 (2010) (administrative 
remedies); id. § 613.330 (banning sex discrimination in employment); id. § 613.420 (allowing plaintiffs 
to go to district court if the Nevada Equal Rights Commission does not find for the plaintiff).  Under 
Title VII, plaintiffs may collect both compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorneys’ fees in 
addition to backpay.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). 
113  For a discussion of the process, see Kathleen M. Paustian, ENE—What Is It? Does It Work?, 
NEV. LAW., Jan. 2007, at 28 (describing the Early Neutral Evaluation program in the U.S. District Court 
for Nevada). 
114  The EEOC opened a Las Vegas local office of its Los Angeles District in August 2006.  Press 
Release, EEOC, EEOC Opens Las Vegas Office (Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/8-9-06.cfm.  A local office, i.e. the type that was opened in Las Vegas, is the smallest unit within 
the EEOC structure; district offices are the largest units, and field offices and area offices rank above 
local offices.  Id.  The Los Angeles District includes southern California and southern Nevada.  EEOC 
Office List and Jurisdictional Map, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/field/index.cfm (last visited May 19, 
2011).  The office accepts and investigates complaints, but all decisions regarding complaints are made 
by the district director in Los Angeles District Office.  See also Matt Ward, EEOC Establishes Vegas 
Presence: Rising Tide of Sexual-Harassment Complaints Prompts Move, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Nov. 
13, 2006, at P14 (describing the events which led to the opening of an office in Las Vegas). 
115  See Staff Members, ACLU OF NEV., http://www.aclunv.org/staff (last visited May 19, 2011).  
The ACLU of Nevada also recently added a legal fellow to its staff.  Id. 
116  See History of the ACLU of Nevada, ACLU OF NEV., http://www.aclunv.org/node/114 (last vi-
sited May 19, 2011). 
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Unions play a significant role in the Las Vegas casino and hospitality 
industries and are a much more important part of employment law practice 
here than elsewhere.  The Culinary Workers of America is a particularly 
prominent player.117  Most of the major casinos have at least a partially 
unionized workforce, and the casino industry and unions appear to have 
learned to cooperate on major issues.118  Some of our employee respondents 
mentioned the importance of the unions in protecting employee rights. 
IV. SOCIAL REALITIES 
We predicted that the Jespersen decision would garner attention in the 
Las Vegas legal community and among casino workers and insiders there 
for multiple reasons.  First, Las Vegas is dominated by the casino industry, 
and this case squarely tackled appearance discrimination in the casino set-
ting.119  Second, the casino industry in Las Vegas attaches, to put it mildly, a 
high degree of importance to appearance: especially gender-differentiated 
and sexualized appearance.  Third, the prior case law on appearance dis-
crimination was thin.  Jespersen not only promised to shape future law on 
the subject, but it also constituted binding precedent on the federal district 
courts in Nevada.  Fourth, because the casinos ask for a high degree of un-
iformity in appearance from their employees, they issue explicit instructions 
to their employees.  And explicit instructions are easier to challenge than 
the informal social pressures that other employers might use.  In sum, this 
was not a case whose dictates could be easily ignored.  Or so we thought.   
At first glance, the practitioner literature suggested that we were on the 
right track.  From the beginning of the litigation in the district court, the 
case garnered attention from practitioners around the country.  And this in-
cluded leading lawyers in Nevada, who both produced client alert memos 
 
117  According to its webpage, the local Culinary Workers Union “is one of the fastest growing pri-
vate sector local unions in the United States.  Membership has climbed from 18,000 union workers in 
1987 to approximately 60,000 members today.  Culinary 226 represents more members than any other 
union in Nevada.”  About the Culinary Workers Union Local 226, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOCAL 
226, http://www.culinaryunion226.org/about.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2011); see also Courtney Alex-
ander, Rise to Power: The Recent History of the Culinary Union in Las Vegas, in THE GRIT BENEATH 
THE GLITTER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 145, 146 (Hal K. Rothman & Mike Davis eds., 2002) 
(describing the success of the Culinary Workers Union). 
118  See Dorothee Benz, Labor’s Ace in the Hole: Casino Organizing in Las Vegas, 26 NEW POL. 
SCI. 525, 526 (2004) (stating that union density in Las Vegas casinos is 65% and on the Strip is 90%, 
which far surpasses the 8.2% union density found in private employers nationwide); see also id. at 533 
(explaining the union organizing techniques and the “labor–management partnership” that resulted in 
Las Vegas casinos). 
119  See John M. Broder, When a City Discovers the Virtues of Vice. And Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 4, 2004, at A20 (describing the interrelationship between Nevada and Clark County governments 
and the casino industry and demonstrating that the casino industry is the most powerful industry in Ne-
vada).  For a discussion of the growth of the casino industry in Nevada, see HAL K. ROTHMAN, DEVIL’S 
BARGAINS 31337 (1998). 
105:689  (2011) The New Old Legal Realism 
 715 
and wrote articles for Gaming Law Review.120  Gaming Law Review even 
reproduced the en banc and the three-judge panel opinions in full for its 
readers.121  Finally, the memos and articles that tackled the en banc decision 
generally cautioned clients that, although the casino had won in this case, 
the en banc opinion left the door open to future litigation on the appearance 
issue.122 
What we found at the ground level, however, did not match our predic-
tions.  We begin with some general impressions from the interviews in sec-
tion A before moving to the specifics in sections B and C. 
A. General Impressions 
From what we were told, the impact of the case on the casino commu-
nity in Las Vegas was, at most, negligible.  No more than a handful of law-
yers we spoke toall of whom spent significant portions of their time 
tackling employment issueswas familiar with the specifics of the case 
and the nuances of the language.  Most of these lawyers appeared to have 
barely skimmed the decision, often in preparation for their meetings with 
us.  At least a couple of the plaintiff-side lawyers did not seem to realize 
that the case had been decided at the en banc level.  The defense-side law-
yers, in numerous client alert memos circulated immediately after the case, 
urged employers to pay attention to the case and consider reviewing their 
appearance codes and policies.123  But no one with whom we talked gave us 
the impression that the case had generated much new work in terms of de-
signing new techniques of compliance or litigation protection.  We also 
found, according to lawyers, judges, and government officials, that there 
was no indication that anyone had seen an increase in litigation against the 
casinos building on the guidance provided by Jespersen.  Similarly, our in-
terviews did not suggest that settlement amounts in appearance discrimina-
 
120  See, e.g., Kamer & Keller, supra note 86,  at 336–37 (reporting on the district court decision in 
Jespersen); Preis et al., supra note 86, at 8991 (same); Courtney Brevelle, A Grooming Standards Win 
for Employers, 4 HOTELIERS (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.4hoteliers.com/4hots_fshw.php?mwi=978 (re-
porting on the three-judge opinion on the appeals court); Patrick Hicks & Veronica Arechederra Hall, 
Makeup Rule Upheld by Ninth Circuit, HR.COM (July 1, 2005), http://www.hr.com/en/communities/
legal/makeup-rule-upheld-by-ninth-circuit_ead1ze8f.html (reporting on the Ninth Circuit panel’s deci-
sion in Jespersen).  
121  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 10 GAMING L. REV. 379 (2006) (reprinting the en banc 
opinion); Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 9 GAMING L. REV. 187 (2005) (reprinting the initial 
Ninth Circuit opinion). 
122  Patrick H. Hicks et al., Reasonable Dress and Grooming Requirements Survive Court Scrutiny, 
10 GAMING L. REV. 342, 34546 (2006); Special Alert!Ninth Circuit Issues Final Decision on 
Harrah’s Appearance Policy Requiring Certain Female Employees to Wear Makeup, EMPLOYER REP. 
(Kamer Zucker Abbott, Las Vegas, Nev.), Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.kzalaw.com/printreport.php?
vol=5&iss=3&art=1.  
123  See supra notes 8687 (citing to memos and articles alerting clients as to the new risks).  
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tion cases had increased after Jespersen.124  That said, our findings are con-
sistent with the possibility that lawyers representing casinos had advised 
their clients before Jesperson was decided about possible strategies and tac-
tics to avoid litigation based on appearance and dress codes.  We discuss 
some of these strategies below.   
As for whether there had been on-the-ground reactions to the case, e.g., 
alterations in training sessions, instruction manuals, or incentive schemes, 
our questions were generally met with puzzlement from nonlawyer em-
ployees.  They said, in effect, “Why would you expect any reaction from 
the casinos?”  Among the more than seventy employee interviews, we did 
not have one single respondent who thought that there had been a percepti-
ble response to the case.  More than a few of our respondents, however, 
asked, as the interview was winding down, “Didn’t the casino win the 
case?”   
We discerned several repeated themes from our interviews.  These syn-
theses of the respondents’ narratives are necessarily subjective and interpre-
tive because they are based on our readings of the interviews.  From our 
initial set of about a dozen respondents, we got a uniform starting point for 
our discussions: there had been little on-the-ground reaction to Jespersen.  
So we explained our project to our respondents, letting them know we were 
interested in how this case affected everyday practices.  But we also told 
our respondents that we were puzzled by our initial findings that not much 
had happened in reaction to the case.  We explained that we were curious as 
to whether we were wrong in terms of our initial findings and, if not, how to 
explain the lack of response.125  The narratives, therefore, are stories about 
why there was no reaction.   
The narratives are reported in the next two sections.  Section B reports 
on the reactions from employees at the various casinos.  The majority of 
these are interviews with women working as servers and bartenders, al-
though we also spoke to some male employees and some executives and 
managers.  Section C reports on our interviews with lawyers and judges 
whose work involves the industry. 
 
124  We are grateful to Frank Easterbrook and Bill Landes for raising the question of settlement 
amounts.  We also made inquiries as to whether there was any perception among insurance companies 
that the price of litigation insurance for casinos had increased as a result of this case.  We found no indi-
cation of an increase in the cost of insurance either. 
125  In effect, by telling our later interviewees what we found in the initial dozen interviews, we may 
have produced something of a framing effect because we may have introduced a cognitive bias that 
caused our later respondents to also report that they had not perceived any change in the wake of Jesper-
sen.  We expect, however, that any such bias would have been overcome if a respondent had seen a real 
change in appearance policies.  
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B. The Employees/Nonlawyers  
1. Assumption of Risk (“We Would Choose to Wear Makeup”).—
With our nonlawyer respondents, we began conversations by describing the 
basics of Jespersen.  Afterward we explained what we were interested in 
learning about by discussing Jespersen: that is, how the law in judicial opi-
nions translates into behavior on the ground.  In response to our introduc-
tions, even though we never asked anyone whether they had heard about the 
case, a number of respondents professed to having at least heard about the 
Jespersen case.  (They typically referred to it as the “makeup case.”)126  
None of the employee respondents had a clear memory of the issues, but 
many remembered that the case had been in the news.  The ones who did 
remember something about the case frequently mentioned that the em-
ployee had worked in a Reno casino, a significant fact for these respon-
dents. 
The respondents explained that Reno’s casino industry is different 
from that of Las Vegas, which is younger, hipper, more attractive, and more 
sexualized.  Respondents depicted the Reno jobs as less glamorous—almost 
depressing.  As one respondent explained: “Reno is different; the casino in-
dustry there is older; something like this would not have happened here.”  
We also heard multiple versions of: “Las Vegas does not just sell gambling; 
it sells a fantasy.”  According to the respondents, Las Vegas casino workers 
are not as likely to bring a lawsuit because they understand the require-
ments of the job to include being part of the construction of a fantasy expe-
rience for customers.  In essence, respondents noted that Las Vegas casino 
employees work in a different environment from that of Reno casino work-
ers.  This difference affects the workers’ view of what the job entailed and 
their willingness to bring suit.  
Some employee respondents used the term “assumption of risk” to de-
scribe their point.  The other explanation that we frequently got was that 
Nevada was a “right to work” state.  Perhaps because the three of us are 
trained as lawyers, we found the invocations of these legal terms by non-
lawyers fascinating.  Not only are “assumption of risk” and “right to work” 
legal terms of art, but the terms’ conventional meanings did not fit the con-
text in which the employee respondents used them.  When someone in-
voked those terms, we would typically follow up by trying to clarify that 
because Title VII, the federal antidiscrimination law, is mandatory, a casino 
defendant cannot use the excuse that an employee has assumed the risk.  
Often we used an example like the following to illustrate our point: 
An employer cannot escape liability for race discrimination by telling all its 
racial minority employees ahead of time that it plans to give them lower sala-
 
126  This was less true with our last set of employee interviews in early 2010, when none of our ap-
proximately half-dozen interviewees gave us an affirmative indication of remembering the case (al-
though they also did not affirmatively say that they had not heard of it). 
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ries and plans not to promote them.  The same applies here.  Employers cannot 
escape the application of antidiscrimination law simply by warning female 
employees ahead of time. 
Despite our comments, the respondents did not change their explanations.  
They continued to insist that Las Vegas casinos provided an atypical work 
situation. 
As for the “Nevada is a ‘right to work’ state” argument, we were in-
itially confused about how the respondents were using that term.  Eventual-
ly we understood the term to refer to antiunion legislation.127  Here, 
respondents seemed to be talking about another legal concept, employment 
at will.  However, the idea of employment at will, which says that employ-
ers, absent an explicit employment contract stating otherwise, can fire em-
ployees without any need to show cause, is also irrelevant to federal 
antidiscrimination law.  In sum these employees told us that they were re-
stricted in their ability to sue in ways that they were actually not.  
This consistent underestimation of legal rights was not what we had 
expected.  Pauline Kim’s now-classic study on employee perceptions about 
“employment at will” showed that employees often think they have more 
rights than they do: the majority of employees in her study thought that they 
could be fired only for cause.128  In Las Vegas, we saw something different.  
Another perception connects to the distinction our respondents were draw-
ing between Las Vegas and Reno.  They seemed to say that the rules that 
applied in Las Vegas were different, particularly for this special category of 
younger and more attractive employees.   
If we had expected our respondents, mostly young women working in 
various jobs in the casinos, to be relieved to hear that they had more legal 
rights to bring gender discrimination claims than they had believed, we 
would have been disappointed.  It seemed not to matter that we had ex-
plained that bringing suits might actually be easier.  The bottom line was 
still that these employees did not expect suits to be brought.129 
 
127  Specifically, “right to work laws” are statues that exist in a number of U.S. states that bar 
agreements between trade union and employers making union membership, dues, or fees a condition on 
entry to the job.  See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 
(1949) (upholding constitutionality of right to work laws).  
128  See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (“[W]orkers appear to sys-
tematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that they have far greater rights 
against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact have under an at-will contract.”).  
129  A caveat here is that our mode of questioning—where we said that we were puzzled by the lack 
of reaction in Las Vegas to this big case—may have induced defensiveness in some of our respondents.  
We did take steps, however, to communicate neutrality in the interviews.  That said, there is literature on 
the stories and myths that develop in certain communities that help make sense of what might otherwise 
be inconsistencies.  See, e.g., KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (2005); Karl E. 
Weick, The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
628 (1993) (reanalyzing the Mann Gulch fire disaster to illustrate problems in our understanding of or-
ganizations).  These stories and myths sometimes have little basis in fact: they are just explanations, 
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2. Bigger Tips for Bigger Breasts.—After we had finished our intro-
ductions with one union officer but before we had even begun the inter-
view, he said, “You should know.  I’ve had women members tell me that 
they get bigger tips if they have bigger boobs.  I’m not going to do anything 
that hurts my members.”  The themes of breast size and particularly breast 
augmentation surgery were ones that our employee respondents frequently 
brought up.  Indeed, to the discomfort of at least one of us, students raised 
questions in our meetings about whether certain casino employers were 
paying for breast augmentations and other cosmetic surgeries and whether 
such expenditures were tax deductible. 
Generally, a conversation’s transition to the topic of breast size oc-
curred in the following fashion.  Jespersen involved a female bartender who 
refused to comply with the casino’s mandatory makeup requirement.  Our 
conversations with casino employees, though, quickly turned from Jesper-
sen’s implications for bartenders to its implications for cocktail servers.  
Cocktail service appears to be the job with the most marked gender differ-
ences: there are hardly any men who work as servers in any of the major ca-
sinos.  Female cocktail servers, for their part, wear high heels, skimpy 
costumes, and makeup, to say nothing of requirements regarding their hair 
and other aspects of their appearance.  High heels and skimpy outfits can 
have negative health effects.  Carrying heavy trays of drinks for multiple 
hours in high heels is not good for one’s ankles, nor is wearing minimal 
clothing in low temperatures.130  The women working in these jobs are often 
slender, which suggests that the long-term impact of carrying heavy drink 
trays in low temperatures might be especially problematic for them. 
Our respondents had no problems whatsoever in understanding and ar-
ticulating the gendered burdens imposed on female cocktail servers.  But 
even while articulating these burdens, they did not perceive them as gender 
discrimination.  Women cocktail servers saw themselves as privileged both 
over men, who couldn’t get these jobs, and over older and less attractive 
women.  The frequent refrain, in the words of one cocktail server, was this: 
“We earn more in tips because we wear makeup, short skirts, and have big-
ger—you know—breasts [laugh].  Men cannot get these jobs.”   
We were told repeatedly that female cocktail servers with the better 
shifts at upscale casinos could earn upwards of $150,000 to $200,000 per 
                                                                                                                           
perhaps just explanations given to outsiders asking stupid questions.  See generally Mark Weidemaier, 
Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts and the Hunt for Pari Passu (U.N.C. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1633439, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633439. 
130  See D. Casey Kerrigan et al., Knee Osteoarthritis and High-Heeled Shoes, 351 LANCET 1399 
(1998); cf. Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness and 
Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear Requirements for Fe-
male Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295, 296 (1997) (“[S]eventy-five percent of the problems eventuating 
in . . . [the foot] corrections performed annually in the United States ‘either result from or are greatly 
aggravated by the use of high-fashion footwear.’” (quoting Francesca Thompson & Michael Coughlin, 
The High Price of High-Fashion Footwear, 76 AM. J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1586, 1587 (1994))). 
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year, including tips.  Many of our respondents felt that, with that much 
earning power, there was little reason to sue.  These women had jobs that 
were hard to get; they were not going to upset the apple cart.  We kept hear-
ing that, if anything, it was the men who should be arguing that they were 
being discriminated against by not being given jobs as cocktail servers.  But 
our interviewees also said that customers would not like male cocktail serv-
ers and would not tip them as well.  One interviewee explained that there 
are male cocktail servers working outside at the swimming pools, but they 
do not work on the “more formal” casino floor.131 
Often, while we were talking about the issue of tips and appearance, 
the respondents themselves would point out that not all the cocktail servers 
were thin and young, especially at older casinos with powerful unions.  On 
a couple of occasions, we were advised to go to casinos such as Caesar’s 
Palace to observe the servers working the afternoon shifts.  Apparently, the 
disjunction between the outfits and the people wearing them was extreme, 
according to our generally younger respondents.  The point seemed to be 
that even these women, who were older and perhaps heavier, were required 
to wear the high heels and skimpy outfits.132  In the end, tips appeared to be 
only part of the equation: having the most attractive female cocktail servers 
was central to the casino’s image. 
These questions of appearance and gender raise a few other theoretical 
points worth mentioning.  First, our respondents brought up the interesting 
and difficult legal question of whether an employer who refuses to hire men 
for a job then gets carte blanche to impose whatever restrictions it wants on 
the women, including imposing stereotyped images.  We suspect that a fed-
eral judge would have little sympathy for the argument that employers can 
opt out of gender discrimination law by engaging in a different kind of dis-
crimination against men.  But this also raises a different question: if these 
cocktail server jobs are so good, why are no men suing to get them—
especially today, as Las Vegas is still reeling from the financial crisis?  Do 
the male potential cocktail servers in Las Vegas also believe that even if 
they got these jobs, they would not be able to earn tips?  Given that many 
casinos have tip-sharing arrangements, it is not clear why men would worry 
 
131  Some months after the interview that we quote in the text, we interviewed a male server who 
worked at the pools.  He explained that his situation was different not only because he could not be a 
server inside the casino but also because the work was seasonal because it was outside at the pool.  We 
asked him whether he felt this was unfair.  He responded that he did not mind the seasonality of the job.  
He explained that he and the other servers could do other jobs or take classes during the year.  He valued 
the flexibility he got by only having to work his server job during the summer. 
132  Some interviewees also suggested that the uniforms in older casinos with older waitresses who 
were represented by the union were more modest.  Based on what we could tell, the uniforms were still 
skimpy but less so than some of the newer casinos’.  And at least one human resources executive 
thought that the outfits at places like the Mirage and Caesar’s Palace were more modest because man-
agement did not want to put the really skimpy costumes on older female servers.  We were also told that 
there are some casinos where there is a choice of costumes, all of them pretty similar but some of them 
slightly longer, and so on. 
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about their individual tips.  Or are the men who would apply for these jobs 
deterred by their efforts to maintain their dignity and masculinity? 
Masculinities theory suggests that men are driven by a need to prove 
their masculinity and demonstrate that they are different from women and 
what they perceive as feminine.133  The job of cocktail server is considered a 
woman’s job by both employees and employers, and it would take a brave 
man to apply for a job that is traditionally associated with feminine sexuali-
ty.  Furthermore, the casinos may discourage men from applying for cock-
tail server jobs.  One human resources executive told us that she had 
anticipated the “problem” of a man applying for a cocktail server job.  She 
considered it a problem because she believed customers prefer female cock-
tail servers.134  To avoid a lawsuit and still deter men from applying for the 
job, she had a very skimpy costume to show to male applicants that they 
would be asked to wear.  Interestingly, there is one major casino that does 
have male cocktail servers on the casino floor.  The male and female cock-
tail servers are called “bevertainers.”  The women are dressed in lace ted-
dies, and the men wear a costume that appears like pajamas with long pants 
and short-sleeve shirts with a v-neck.  There is a clear difference in the 
amount of flesh displayed by the male and female costumes. 
The second point, which was reinforced by the human resources execu-
tive mentioned above, has to do with customer preferences.  Respondents 
frequently argued that casinos have to employ female cocktail servers who 
fit a certain mold because this is what customers want.  More specifically, 
they emphasized that cocktail servers are a key element in creating the spe-
cial and unique Las Vegas image.  But as a matter of discrimination law, 
employers cannot justify discriminatory practices on the basis of customer 
preferences.135  The only exception to this is the narrow set of cases that fit 
within the BFOQ category.  But commentators, the courts, and the EEOC 
all seem to agree that establishing an employment criterion as a BFOQ is 
very difficult.  Sex is a BFOQ only for the narrow sets of jobs for which sex 
or gender is essential; Playboy Bunnies and private nurses are frequently 
 
133  See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construc-
tion of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 182, 185–86 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004); Jo-
seph H. Pleck, Men’s Power with Women, Other Men, and Society: A Men’s Movement Analysis, in 
FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES, supra, at 57, 61–62.   
134  Along a similar vein, a male blackjack dealer complained that when he applied for his job at a 
local casino, he was told that the casino wanted to hire female dealers because the clientele liked attrac-
tive women.  For a number of years, the management “kicked all of the men (dealers) out of the high 
limit pit.”  Recently, the dealer noted, the casino has moved more men into the high limit pit because the 
women complained about the clientele acting up.  See also Brooks v. Hilton Casinos, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 
1115 (D. Nev. 1989) (holding that the defendant casino had violated Title VII by firing thirty-seven 
male dealers and floormen and replacing them with twenty-four women and thirteen men, a dispropor-
tionate number of women compared to the hiring pool). 
135  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2010); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that an airline is not allowed to discriminate against males in hiring because 
customers prefer female flight attendants).  
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invoked as examples.136  Assuming that neither the lack of men in the job 
nor the BFOQ exception poses barriers to women bringing a case, the cock-
tail servers in Las Vegas casinos would likely have a case of unequal bur-
dens on men and women in the casino that employs both men and women 
as cocktail servers and in other casinos in which men and women occupy 
jobs with similar tasks and different titles and have disparately revealing 
uniforms.  They also have a claim for sex stereotyping for provocative uni-
forms that cause vulnerability to sex harassment.  In other words, they 
could bring precisely the type of case that Jespersen seemed to say would 
result in victory for the plaintiffs.  Our respondents saw matters differently.  
They saw us as failing to understand the casino industry and the culture of 
Las Vegas.  And they seemed invested in making the Vegas “fantasy” mod-
el work by permitting employers to require sexually suggestive appearance.  
3. Looking in All the Wrong Places.—A persistent theme in the narr-
atives was that makeup issues were simply not very important.  Our respon-
dents could readily identify areas in which they thought the casinos were 
concerned about legal regulation: first and foremost was the issue of 
weight.  Casino executives, especially of the high-end casinos, care despe-
rately about the weight of female servers.  Our respondents were convinced 
that the casino lawyers and managers were constantly thinking of ways to 
get around antidiscrimination laws that might keep employers from impos-
ing weight restrictions.137  More than twenty-five years ago, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that female flight attendants could make out a prima facie case of 
sex discrimination based on weight requirements that an airline had admit-
tedly imposed to create an image of a slender female flight crew.138  Al-
though employers and their representatives whom we interviewed paid 
attention to issues of weight discrimination, they seemed unconcerned with 
other types of discrimination that were also at least arguably illegal under 
Jespersen.139  Second and relatedly, we were also told that casino manage-
ment worries about dealing with pregnancy: not only what to do with the 
pregnant women (“how to hide them,” as one executive phrased it) but also 
how to get them back to their original weights once they returned to their 
 
136  See McGinley, supra note 18, at 269 (discussing how the BFOQ defense applies to Playboy 
Bunnies); Yuracko, supra note 77, at 149 (discussing exceptions to the rule that it is illegal for employ-
ers to discriminate on the basis of sex). 
137  Consistent with what our nonlawyer respondents suggested, a number of the lawyer respondents 
confirmed that a major concern of the casinos was dealing with overweight cocktail servers.  We heard 
the story of a prominent casino owner who was misheard by a group of cocktail servers as having called 
them “blue whales.”  That apparently caused a great deal of unhappiness among the servers.  According 
to our respondents, this owner, though famously concerned about regulating the weight of his female 
employees, had said something else with the prefix blue and had been misheard. 
138  Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Yuracko, supra note 
49, at 20 (explaining Gerdom in the context of appearance code cases). 
139  A different possibility is that the union agreements that apply in some casinos have protections 
against weight discrimination.  But none of our respondents pointed to these. 
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jobs.  Third (although this did not come up as often as we thought it might), 
our respondents addressed the question of how to tackle the problem of ag-
ing cocktail servers, who are, the implication was, less attractive and heavi-
er.   
A number of our respondents were convinced that some of the casinos 
had developed strategies to circumvent the law.  Reportedly, some casinos 
changed the definition of jobs from “cocktail servers” to “dancers” or “en-
tertainers” on the theory that dancers could be required to be young and thin 
because they had to be fit to dance.  According to some of our respondents, 
the management could therefore put employees who were listed as dancers 
through fitness trials and weigh them.  Another example some respondents 
brought up was of certain casinos defining their server jobs as a combina-
tion of model and server to make it acceptable to impose even more strin-
gent weight restrictions than those imposed on non-model cocktail 
waitresses.  A third reported strategy was to use subcontractors and inde-
pendent contractors.  Apparently, the casinos preferred to subcontract out 
the work for some of the female dancer jobs at high-end night clubs, and the 
subcontracting firms, in turn, hire independent contractors.  A final reported 
strategy involved the recent opening of private clubs within the casinos that 
are open to adults only.  These member-only clubs, which are often operat-
ed by companies other than the casinos, advertise an atmosphere of heigh-
tened female sexuality, with women bartenders and cocktail servers wearing 
skimpy outfits and with admission advertised as free for women in an effort 
to attract male customers.  Because these clubs are open to adults only, ca-
sinos would have a better argument that imposing a sexy dress code on fe-
male employees is a BFOQ.  We confess that we remain unsure of how well 
any of the other strategies work to bypass legal requirements, but a number 
of our respondents pointed to the independent contractor phenomenon and 
wondered whether it was part of a strategy to impose greater restrictions on 
employees.140  Our guess is that at least some federal judges would be skep-
tical about, if not hostile toward, these strategies.  Our respondents empha-
sized, though, that, with the exception of the growth of the club culture, 
none of these strategies or concerns on the part of the employers is new.  
They all predated Jespersen. 
C. Lawyers and Judges 
This section reports on conversations with twenty-seven lawyers and 
ten judges in the Las Vegas area.  The lawyers were about equally divided 
between the plaintiff side and the casino defense side.  The vast majority of 
our defense-lawyer respondents were male.  On the plaintiff side, the gend-
 
140  One respondent speculated that the independent-contractor technique might be a method of get-
ting particular jobs, for which the casinos wanted the dancers or servers to be especially young and at-
tractive, out of the ambit of the union’s collective bargaining agreements.  In other words, the 
respondent suggested that this technique was not about avoiding Title VII liability at all.   
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 724 
er balance was more even.  At the outset of this project, we were concerned 
about sample bias problems because we were using the snowball method of 
collecting interviews.  However, the number of lawyers and judges in Las 
Vegas who do employment discrimination work and could discuss the im-
pact of Jespersen on casino industry practices is small.  Based both on our 
prior knowledge and what we learned during our interviews, we suspect we 
spoke to at least 30% to 40% of the population that might be meaningfully 
studied.   
Although we report the lawyer narratives as a whole, there were some 
structural differences between the practices of the plaintiff-side and de-
fense-side lawyers.  The former tended to be in rather ramshackle small, of-
ten solo, practices, whereas the latter appeared better-heeled and tended to 
be in larger practices, including, of course, in-house practice at casino man-
agement companies.  We note instances in which there were systematic dif-
ferences in the narratives of the plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers.   
We report on the judge interviews last because the judges, more than 
any of our other respondents, attempted to step back and provide explana-
tions for the phenomena that we had observed.  Also, perhaps because 
judges, like legal academics, are socialized to attach importance to judicial 
reasoning, they seemed to understand what puzzled us.  It is hard for us to 
know how seriously any of our respondents took our inquiries.  But as a 
group, the judges were the most gracious and gave us the most time: almost 
all our interviews went well over the one hour that we typically scheduled.   
1. A Race to the Bottom and Weight Problems (Again).—A frequent 
refrain from the lawyers, consistent with what we heard from the em-
ployees, was that the employment discrimination issues that the casinos 
cared about were not the ones we were investigating.  Specifically, legal is-
sues relating to makeup requirements and dress codes were not big concerns 
to casinos.  They were most concerned about their employees’ weights and 
perhaps their ages.  With respect to makeup and dress codes, the lawyers 
reported that casinos had to ensure that the employees did not wear too 
much makeup or clothing that was too sexualized.  In some locales, they 
were more concerned about poor grooming.  In this context, a number of 
respondents sought to tell us the “real” story about Jespersen.  They re-
counted that the company had been attempting to make its operation, par-
ticularly its casinos in Reno, more “professional.”141  Apparently, a number 
of casinos were concerned that their employees were not taking adequate 
care of their appearances.  Harrah’s, in particular, was trying to institute 
scientific management techniques to create greater uniformity and accoun-
tability among its employees.  And as part of a package of reforms that 
were put in place, Harrah’s imposed uniform appearance standards.  If Har-
rah’s or other casinos wanted their employees to be more sexualized, one 
 
141  This story is consistent with the research reported in Avery & Crain, supra note 38, at 57–78. 
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respondent explained, they only needed to relax their appearance codes.  
The servers, seeking more tips, would have shown up in outfits more outra-
geous and sexualized than anything the casino could have come up with.  
One respondent triumphantly concluded that people who did not understand 
the casino industry were getting the problem exactly backwards.  The casi-
nos often have to desexualize their employees and strictly regulate their be-
havior with customers so that the employees will not harm the reputation of 
the casinos in their desire to gain more income in tips.142   
We were told repeatedly that the issue that employers really cared 
about was weight.  And this was particularly true with respect to female 
cocktail servers and dancers.  Employers very much wanted to impose strict 
weight restrictions but were concerned about running afoul of anti-
discrimination law.  The lawyers we spoke with all indicated familiarity 
with the airline cases from the 1970s and 1980s, when airlines lost on mul-
tiple occasions in litigation over whether they could impose more stringent 
weight restrictions on female employees.143  To the extent that counsel for 
the casinos thought about strategies to protect their employers from dis-
crimination cases, their task was to figure out how to avoid suit over weight 
restrictions.  In this context, they often mentioned the strategy used by one 
casino, redesignating the jobs of its cocktail servers as entertainers (“bever-
tainers” to be specific).  As noted, this story had also come up frequently in 
the employee narratives.  That strategy, some lawyers speculated, might 
have allowed the casino to impose more stringent weight restrictions on its 
employees.  After all, some respondents explained, everyone knows that 
dancers have to be thin and fit.  We found the bevertainer strategy particu-
larly interesting when we made our own reconnaissance trip to the casino in 
question.  The female bevertainers, dressed in outfits best described as lace 
teddies, were moving around the casino floor with heavy trays of cocktails.  
Their few male counterparts, dressed in long pajamas and loose fitting tops, 
also served drinks.  But after waiting for nearly an hour to see any dancing 
or entertainment and asking various employees when the dancing would 
start, we finally had to go up to one of the bevertainers and ask her whether 
she also did the dances that we had been told about.  In response, she asked 
us to wait for a few minutes and then got up on a small stage in the middle 
of the casino floor and lip-synched a song into a microphone.  There was, in 
our opinion, minimal dancing and entertainment value.  To be fair to her, it 
was early evening, not exactly peak casino time, and middle-aged law pro-
fessors hardly looked to be big tippers.  After doing her song and dance rou-
 
142  The adjective “professional” also came up frequently in conversations with employees, who ap-
peared to attach significant importance to the professional nature of their jobs.  It did not matter that in 
some cases these were jobs that required minimal clothing, such as serving cocktails or attending to cus-
tomers poolside.  If anything, the less clothing the more important it was for the employees in question 
to describe themselves as professional.   
143  See, e.g., Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 437, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that im-
posing weight restrictions on women but not on men was disparate treatment under Title VII). 
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tine, our bevertainer took her tip, grabbed her tray, gave us a puzzled look 
and ran off to serve more drinks. 
As in our employee interviews, we were puzzled by the lawyers’ re-
peated invocation of concerns about weight discrimination language in 
Gerdom because they did not react the same way to the sex stereotyping 
language of Jespersen.  If a casino employee brought a Title VII suit alleg-
ing discrimination based on the sex stereotyping underlying certain weight 
requirements, she might succeed under Gerdom.  However, such a case is 
not clearly stronger than one asserting discrimination based on sex stereo-
typing underlying other sex-differentiated appearance standards applied in 
casinos under Jespersen.  Plus, Gerdom was decided in a different work set-
ting, in which safety rather than entertainment is the primary task of the 
employee.  We also expected the lawyers to be more concerned about Jes-
persen than Gerdom because it struck closer to home, given that the factual 
situation involved a casino server.  Moreover, the weight component of ca-
sino appearance policies could more easily be applied in a gender-neutral 
way than many of the other appearance guidelines.144  In response to a law-
yer–respondent bringing up the concern about weight discrimination law-
suits, one of us asked, “If this is such a big concern, why not simply hire 
some men and subject them to equally stringent weight restrictions?  After 
all, that would produce a scenario with equally bad treatment of both gend-
ers.”  In response, the lawyer we were interviewing did not say anything; he 
just looked incredulous that we would have brought up such a ridiculous 
hypothetical.145   
The casinos’ disinterest in Jespersen is even more confusing because, 
even if the primary concern of the casinos was the possibility of a weight 
discrimination claim, Jespersen should have been important to their calcu-
lations.  In theory, gender discrimination law could be brought to bear on 
the weight discrimination issue even if a casino only had female employees 
in the relevant job category.  But doing so would require stretching the log-
ic of the sex stereotyping line of cases to apply to weight.  Female plaintiffs 
 
144  Of course, if a woman gains weight because she is pregnant, she will be protected by the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, which is an amendment to Title VII.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (defining 
discrimination prohibited “because of sex” to include discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth or related medical conditions”).  Moreover, there are some cases under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act that prohibit discrimination based on the disability of being morbidly obese.  See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that morbid obesity, 
when associated with a physiological condition, is a disability under the ADA); Gaddis v. Oregon, 21 F. 
App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that morbid obesity is a disability under the ADA).  But the con-
cern about weight in the casinos, while also applicable to pregnant women, went beyond pregnant wom-
en and occurred long before an employee could be considered “morbidly obese.” 
145  A similar point to the one we made in our interview, however, was made in an article in Gaming 
Law Review by partners in a prominent defense-side firm in an article advising casino clients about 
weight discrimination issues.  See Kamer & Keller, supra note 86, at 344 (advising clients that if they 
were going to impose weight restrictions on female employees, they would have to impose similarly 
stringent restrictions on the male employees as well). 
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would have to argue that the female employees subjected to these weight 
restrictions were being unduly burdened.  This is ironic because the most 
important case on stereotypingand one that would control any case de-
cided in Las Vegas—is Jespersen.  Put differently, if the biggest concern of 
casino lawyers is handling weight discrimination lawsuits, then that concern 
should have made them intimately familiar with the discussion of stereotyp-
ing in Jespersen.  Specifically, Jespersen could be read to say that gender 
stereotyping falls afoul of Title VII when the stereotyping results in making 
job performance unduly difficult (e.g., by requiring employees to wear the 
type of outfits that then subjected them to harassment by customers).  But 
not only did none of our respondents bring up this connection between 
weight discrimination and Jespersen, to our chagrin, they also did not show 
the least bit of interest in hearing us talk about it.  In sum, the lawyers of 
Las Vegas were clearly concerned about weight discrimination.  But their 
concern seemed somewhat attenuated from the legal restrictions on discrim-
ination.  Something else was going on. 
2. Not Remunerative Enough.—The explanation most often given by 
the judges echoed one that we received also from the lawyers.  It was that 
the set of cases that might be generated by the roadmap laid out in Jesper-
sen—high heels, sexy outfits, makeup, etc.—were not profitable enough for 
plaintiff-side lawyers to take on.  This explanation intrigued us because, 
elsewhere in the country, federal employment discrimination litigation had 
been one of the fastest growing practice areas until about ten years ago.146  
The nationwide decline in filings of employment discrimination cases147 
may in part account for the lack of appearance discrimination cases.  Yet 
the judges we interviewed did not report an overall marked decline in em-
ployment discrimination cases, and the empirical data show that the Ninth 
 
146  Federal employment civil rights filings increased from 12,962 to 21,157 between the 1993 and 
2000 terms, which reflects an increase from 5.7% to 8.2% of all civil filings.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS app. tbl.C-2A (2008) (reporting, 
for U.S. district courts, the number of civil cases commenced, by nature of suit, during the twelve-month 
period ending September 30, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/1997/appendices/c2asep97.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS app. tbl.C-2A (2001) (reporting, for U.S. district courts, the 
number of civil cases commenced, by nature of suit, during the twelve-month period ending September 
30, 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2001/appendices/
c02asep01.pdf. For the prior period, see John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature 
of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 986 (1991).  More recent research 
suggests that filings in this area have declined over the past decade, that employment discrimination cas-
es account for less than six percent of the federal docket, and that employment discrimination claims are 
no longer the largest category of cases.  Kevin Clermont & Stewart Schwab, Employment Discrimina-
tion Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104 (2009). 
147  See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 146, at 116–21 (describing the drop in employment dis-
crimination filings that occurred after 1998). 
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Circuit has seen a slower overall decline than many other circuits.148  In-
stead, judges specifically stated that they had not seen any appearance dis-
crimination cases even though they acknowledged that the casino industry 
emphasizes sexuality and appearance.  The lack of appearance code litiga-
tion puzzled us given that casinos are well-heeled defendants and (to our 
minds) the cases would be winnable.149  
As we began to discern that there had been little reaction to Jespersen, 
we were so confused that we were briefly concerned we had misread the 
case.  But even if we have, none of our judicial respondents raised signifi-
cant issues with our reading of Jespersen.  A couple of them pointed out 
that, despite the dicta we were asking about, Jespersen had lost, and the 
case’s outcome might be the lesson that lawyers and litigants would take 
out of the case.  But the judges themselves indicated that they would be 
guided by the reasoning, not the disposition, of the en banc panel’s opinion.  
Perhaps the judges were humoring us or being polite, but they seemed to 
recognize that the language in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision poten-
tially opened the gates wider for litigation against the casinos.   
What we were missing, the judges explained, was an understanding of 
financial dynamics of these cases.  A hypothetical plaintiff suing a casino 
for employment discrimination is unlikely to generate a significant enough 
dollar amount of damages to make the case worth investing in for a plain-
tiff’s lawyer.  Assuming the plaintiff was fired, she could at best hope to re-
ceive lost wages for a short period of time.  Further, if she were working in 
the industry, it is likely that she would already be working at a new job.  If 
so, her damages would be even smaller, and she would probably be re-
quired to wear the same outfits, or at least something similar, to what she 
had been required to wear at her last job. 
The next explanation was that the casinos are unlikely to readily settle 
a case attacking something as basic to their image as the appearance rules 
governing cocktail server outfits.  The plaintiff-side lawyers in Las Vegas, 
typically solo practitioners with limited assets, cannot afford drawn-out liti-
gation against the casinos.  As one judge put it, they would get “buried” if 
they tried to fight the casinos on an issue like this. 
In addition, Las Vegas is a “one industry town.”  If an employee de-
velops a reputation as a troublemaker, she might get blacklisted.  Once an 
employee is blacklisted in the casino industry, the judge respondents ex-
plained, it is difficult to get rehired.  These are scarce jobs; employees who 
want to keep working in the industry are unlikely to sue.  Our respondents 
emphasized that the information-sharing mechanisms in the casino industry 
 
148  See id. at 120 n.47 (finding that the Ninth Circuit had a smaller differential between the plain-
tiffs’ reversal rate and the defendants’ reversal rate than the national average). 
149  Nationwide, it is likely that appearance discrimination cases have not made up a significant por-
tion of the increase in employment discrimination cases.  Given the importance of appearances in the 
casino business, though, we expected more litigation on that front in Las Vegas.   
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are superior to those in most other settings.  Because Las Vegas attracts 
more than its share of troublemakers, our respondents suggested, casinos 
spend significant resources trying to identify them ahead of time.  Casinos 
are also willing to cooperate with each other in policing problematic em-
ployees despite a state law prohibiting blacklisting.  Apparently, the securi-
ty experts at the casinos regularly share information with each other about 
misbehaving guests and employees. 
3. The Missing Class Action Bar.—The foregoing story about the 
high costs of these cases made us ask: What precisely is so costly about 
bringing this type of a case, especially given the possibility of recovering 
generous attorney’s fees under Title VII?150  As we conceptualized the hy-
pothetical case, the facts would be simple: female servers are required to 
wear high heels and short outfits that expose them to higher risks of foot in-
jury and respiratory infection whereas the men are not.  Alternatively, the 
case might involve female cocktail servers who, because of their outfits, are 
subjected to harassment by male customers.  With a large enough number 
of cocktail servers as plaintiffs, these cases should be relatively easy—
finding experts to testify about the health burdens or likely levels of ha-
rassment should not be difficult.  Our respondents suggested, however, that 
our assumptions might be wrong on multiple grounds.  First, we were think-
ing in terms of class actions.  Local employment lawyers in Las Vegas 
bring individual cases, not class actions.  There is no meaningful class ac-
tion practice in the employment discrimination area in Las Vegas.151  
Second, these employees not only value their jobs but also value the ability 
to switch jobs.  Even with minimal education, they could earn the kind of 
income that few other jobs could provide; thus they are unlikely to get to-
gether to form a class.   
A few things puzzled us about the absence of a significant class action 
bar in Las Vegas.  If there are profitable cases to be brought, why does a 
sophisticated class action firm from, for example, nearby California, not 
show up to take on the case?152  The story about casino workers being un-
 
150  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006). 
151  A search of Westlaw uncovered three class action employment discrimination suits filed in the 
District Court for the District of Nevada.  We ran the search string “co(nv) & ((employ! /s discrim!) /p 
(“class action”))” in the FED9-ALL database.  Only one was brought by a private firm: Carelli & Mar-
tin, a Las Vegas firm, brought an Age Discrimination in Employment Act suit on behalf of University of 
Nevada employees.  Keeton v. Univ. of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).  The two other class 
actions were brought by the EEOC.  EEOC v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Corp., No. 2:07-cv-01195-RLH-
PAL, 2009 WL 2489282 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2009); EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 488 F. 
Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Nev. 2007). 
152  California law firms and public interest law groups have taken antidiscrimination suits in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere and have successfully filed for class certification.  The largest class-action suit in 
history was filed by California lawyers against Wal-Mart.  Although the district court certified the class 
and the appeals court affirmed, the U.S. Supreme Court held that certification was improper.  Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 576–77 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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willing to sue because their jobs are so remunerative also has some holes in 
it.  Even if the jobs pay well, our subjects indicated that they also tend to be 
short-lived in many cases.  The most remunerative of cocktail server jobs 
are reserved for the young and attractive.  When these employees are no 
longer young and attractive and are in danger of losing their jobs, why 
would they not sue?  We frequently raised these questions but did not come 
away with clear answers.  Still, it bears mentioning that the explanation that 
employees are reluctant to sue because they consider themselves fortunate 
to have highly remunerative jobs in the casino industry is consistent with 
what we heard from both the employees and the plaintiff-side lawyers.  
4. The EEOC’s Role.—Absent an adequate class action bar, why has 
the EEOC not brought an appearance discrimination suit against the casi-
nos?  The EEOC, unlike the Las Vegas plaintiffs’ bar, is not substantially 
limited in either money or expertise.  Our judicial respondents noted, how-
ever, that although one might ordinarily expect the EEOC to step in, it did 
not have a significant presence in Las Vegas.  That led us to ask why.  We 
hypothesized that casinos had exerted their influence in Washington, D.C., 
to make sure that the EEOC left the casino industry alone.  Our intervie-
wees explained that the local EEOC office had opened only a few years be-
fore and had been staffed by a recent graduate of UNLV,153 who quit 
relatively soon, leaving the Las Vegas office with no on-site attorneys for 
nearly a year.  During that time period, Las Vegas matters were handled by 
the Los Angeles office.154   
As best we can tell, there is no sinister story behind the EEOC’s li-
mited presence in Las Vegas.  It turns out that the Los Angeles office is re-
sponsible for a large geographic area, with minimal staff.  Moreover, with 
the limited staff available to the EEOC, the agency has brought a number of 
significant cases against the casinos for harassment occurring in the back of 
the casinos.  The harassment alleged in these cases was severe, often consti-
tuting rape, and the EEOC believed that handling these cases first was a 
priority.  We also heard that Washington, D.C., had not shown any great en-
thusiasm for the aggressive policing of employment discrimination cases 
during the two Bush Administrations, but we heard nothing specific about 
the casino industry.   
That said, our interviews demonstrate that the EEOC has made choices 
regarding what kinds of cases to pursue in Las Vegas.  And appearance dis-
crimination cases, which might have followed in the wake of Jespersen, 
have not been on its agenda.  The EEOC has investigated casinos, but our 
interviewees explained that its primary interest has been in sex harassment 
cases.  Our impression is that the EEOC’s agenda is, in part, demand-
driven, i.e., its agenda is a function of the kinds of cases that come in the 
 
153  The office opened on August 9, 2006.  Press Release, supra note 114. 
154  See Ward, supra note 114. 
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door rather than a broader strategy that attempts to fill gaps in the litigation 
landscape.  Not one of our respondents appeared to lay blame at the feet of 
the EEOC, however.  Most respondents, at least those who are plaintiff-
oriented, thought that the EEOC’s presence in Las Vegas has improved 
matters on the antidiscrimination front because the state’s equal rights of-
fices had been doing precious little. 
5. Judicial Hostility.—Given the rates at which federal judges grant 
motions for summary judgment in Title VII cases,155 we expected judges to 
treat our project with skepticism if not hostility.  These rates suggested to us 
that judges perceive a high fraction of employment discrimination cases to 
be baseless.  If our assumptions were right, then the last thing judges would 
be interested in was a project asking why there were not more cases being 
brought.  The judges, however, claimed to be open to the concept of an ap-
pearance discrimination class action claim against the casinos.  Whether 
they would indeed be willing to certify such a class is unknown given the 
lack of litigation.  Litigants may not file such suits in Nevada because of a 
perception that local judges are hostile to appearance discrimination suits. 
The judges with whom we spoke, however, demonstrated no open hos-
tility to either the broad category of Title VII cases or the subcategory of 
appearance discrimination cases although, as mentioned above, they did 
question the value of our project.  Indeed, the judges did not indicate that 
they perceived an excess of cases in this area.  Nor did they evince any un-
willingness to follow the dictates of the Ninth Circuit.  They recognized the 
same passages in Jespersen that we had flagged as potentially opening the 
doors to increased litigation over appearance discrimination.  Unlike us, 
however, they were not surprised that there had been little on-the-ground 
reaction to Jespersen.  The bottom line for the judges was that appearance 
discrimination cases were simply not being brought.  The judges we spoke 
to may have been socially conservative (they appeared to be, based on the 
nature and tone of their comments), but they indicated interest in the puzzle 
and seemed willing to give us their time and intellectual energy to help fig-
ure out why Jespersen has had so little impact.  In hindsight, it is not sur-
 
155  See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District 
Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882 fig.1 (2007) (reporting that in 1989 5% of cases in their 
sample and in 2000 less than 10% were terminated by summary judgment motion); Clermont & Schwab, 
supra note 146, at 128; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 439 fig.6, 440, 457 app. (2004) (re-
porting that approximately 20% of all types of employment discrimination cases in U.S. district courts 
between 1979 and 2000 were terminated by nontrial adjudication (identified as “motions” and compris-
ing summary judgment and limited other types of motions), averaging 16.63% before 1992 and 20.89% 
from 1992 to 2001); see also Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environ-
ment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tor-
tured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 
203 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Lit-
igation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007).  
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prising that these judges displayed no hostility to Jespersen-type cases; they 
do not see enough of them to be hostile to them.  As to Title VII cases gen-
erally, although we perceived no hostility, the plaintiffs’ bar certainly be-
lieves, and statistics support their belief to a certain extent, that the judges 
are, if not hostile, at least aggressive in granting summary judgment.156  And 
a recent article by Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab suggests that an 
overall drop in employment discrimination cases nationwide may have re-
sulted from excessive judicial pretrial adjudication in defendants’ favor.157 
The federal judges with whom we spoke had seen enough employment 
discrimination cases to understand their dynamics especially well.  The fed-
eral courts in Nevada run an “early neutral evaluation” mediation program 
in which all employment discrimination cases go through a preliminary 
screening by a magistrate judge.158  The magistrate judge evaluates the 
complaint, sits down with the parties, and tries to give them a realistic pic-
ture of the strengths and weaknesses of their case.  If there had been even 
the smallest spike in employment litigation as a result of Jespersen, these 
magistrate judges would have seen it.  The magistrate judges with whom we 
spoke saw no effect, though, not even in terms of preliminary mediations.  
As one judge observed, it was hardly surprising that the casinos had not 
reacted to Jespersen by altering their behavior: the litigation risk landscape 
had not changed as a result of the case, so why should they alter their beha-
vior?159   
6. Dennis Rodman and the Wild Wild West.—Like the various casino 
employees we interviewed, our judicial respondents took pains to try to ex-
plain to us the unique nature of the Las Vegas casino industry.  This is a 
town dominated by a single industry and one that has grown into a major 
metropolis only relatively recently.  Judges told us that the legal market is 
not as sophisticated as those in most other major U.S. cities.  It was only a 
decade ago that the state got its first law school, at UNLV.  We also heard 
on multiple occasions that, as a cultural matter, the people of Las Vegas do 
not like regulation; most of them are attracted to Las Vegas because it is the 
“Wild West.”   
The casino industry sells a sexualized product.  Las Vegas attempted to 
become more “family-friendly” about a decade ago, but it did not work.  No 
one pretends that attracting families is the primary goal any longer.  The 
new promotion slogan is “What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas,” a motto 
that is decidedly not aimed at filling the casinos with families.  According 
 
156  See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 146, at 128. 
157  See id. at 127–28. 
158  See supra note 113. 
159  As noted earlier, conversations with those familiar with the insurance industry indicated that 
nothing had changed as a result of Jespersen.  One interviewee, an expert in Nevada insurance law, told 
us that there was nothing in the literature that even hinted at appearance and dress codes litigation as a 
potential risk. 
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to one respondent, “The industry quickly realized that these families simply 
did not spend enough, and they certainly did not spend irresponsibly.  It is 
the twenty-three-year-old from Los Angeles who is going to drop $5,000 
sitting at the craps table.”  The general theme in the explanations we re-
ceived was as follows: once the business model changed and advertising 
stopped trying to attract families, the “packaging” changed.  Whereas Las 
Vegas was always known for commodifying sex, even while it sold its 
“family-friendly” image, the new packaging is even more sexual than be-
fore.  And the outfits of the cocktail servers are a crucial element of the fan-
tasy being sold.  The casino industry in Las Vegas is not going to alter its 
behavior in the ways that the language in Jespersen might have it do.  The 
casinos have tried the family-resort model, and it failed; they are not going 
back.   
Our respondents took pains to emphasize that the foregoing does not 
mean that there are no limits.  In illustrating these limits, multiple respon-
dents brought up a set of highly publicized incidents involving the infamous 
former professional basketball player Dennis Rodman.  Apparently, Rod-
man used to be a frequent visitor to Las Vegas.  He was also legendary for 
his misbehavior, particularly for sexually harassing employees.  In one in-
cident that was recounted to us, he reached across the table to grab an em-
ployee’s breasts.  These incidents resulted in legal action by the employees 
who were harassed, and the casino management was quite unhappy with 
Rodman’s behavior.160 
CONCLUSION: THE IRRELEVANCE OF CASE LAW? 
An initial conclusion that might be drawn from our study is that case 
law, and specifically the nuanced judicial reasoning of appellate judges, is 
largely irrelevant to the day-to-day realities of life in Las Vegas.  Even 
when a case has a myriad of factors predicting a significant impact on the 
ground, it can in fact have only a negligible impact.  Indeed, nothing 
changed as a result of Jespersen.161  In light of this finding, we sought to 
 
160  See, e.g., Carri Geer, Hilton Sued by Waitress, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 16, 1999, at 1B (stating 
that a cocktail waitress filed a Federal Title VII action against her employer for sexual harassment, al-
leging that Dennis Rodman had grabbed her breasts); James Jahnke, Check It Out, Mate: Slick Digs for 
Chess Tourney, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 29, 2009, at 18A; The Buzz, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 2007, at 
A10 (describing lawsuits against Dennis Rodman for sexual assault in Las Vegas); Eeyore, Dennis 
Rodman Needs to Keep His Hands to Himself, CELEB GOSSIP JUNKIE (Nov. 26, 2007, 7:47 AM), http://
celebgossipjunkie.blogspot.com/2007/11/dennis-rodman-needs-to-keep-his-hands.html.  Interview sub-
jects repeatedly used these “Rodman stories” to illustrate the boundaries of what was considered accept-
able behavior.  Rodman’s antics were not considered acceptable.  Even some of our cab drivers who 
were not interview subjects but liked to share their views of Vegas, told stories about him. 
161  The observation that even the most canonical of cases can sometimes have little real impact on 
on-the-ground realities, however, is not new.  For example, the question of what impact, minimal or not, 
Brown v. Board of Education had has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 
(2004) (challenging the view that Brown promoted racial justice); GERALD ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: 
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discover the factors which limited the opinion’s impact.  What our respon-
dents gave us were their explanations, as daily observers of this particular 
setting, for why there was not an impact. 
Those explanations suggest a view of legal impact that puts social and 
economic factors at the center of the model of legal impact.  Cases cannot 
have an impact if the local social and economic variables are not aligned in 
a fashion that allows the impact to occur.  Sociologist Kieran Healy’s re-
search on presumed consent laws and organ donations is illustrative.162  
Healy examined the effects of presumed consent laws on rates of cadaveric 
organ donation, i.e., donations from the dead.163  The general assumption in 
the literature on organ donation is that presumed consent laws are crucial in 
inducing higher rates of donation—and the high rates of organ donation in 
Spain are frequently invoked in the context.164  Healy’s cross-country em-
pirical analysis, however, suggests that differences in the legal regimes can-
not explain differences in behavior.  Altering the relevant law, he finds, 
makes little difference unless there are changes in the relevant social institu-
tions.  In the Spanish approach, the key was that a “proactive donor detec-
tion program performed by well-trained transplant coordinators, the 
introduction of systematic death audits in hospitals, and the combination of 
a positive social atmosphere with adequate economic reimbursement for the 
hospitals have accounted for this success.”165 
A number of factors in the casino industry might have combined to ne-
gate any possible impact of Jespersen.  Those include the high wages (in-
cluding tips) that casino industry workers make, the information-sharing 
mechanisms of the casinos, the nature of the legal market, the absence of a 
highly developed class action bar, the strength of the unions, the possibly 
low level of education of the workforce, and the lack of a significant EEOC 
office.  The bottom line is not that case law is irrelevant or unable to pro-
duce social change but rather that its relevance on the ground is likely de-
pendent on the operation of local social and economic dynamics.  The case 
law can change radically; however, if local actors earn such high wages that 
they have no incentive to sue, if local plaintiff lawyers lack the ability to 
coordinate and finance the appropriate lawsuit, or if the defense lawyers and 
their clients simply seem too strong and too wealthy to allow any lawsuit 
against them to succeed, the end result will be that there are no cases.  And 
that, in turn, will result in minimal on-the-ground impact. 
                                                                                                                           
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 72–106 (2d ed. 2008) (presenting the “constrained court” 
view, which finds that case decisions do not promote social reform); David Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow 
History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151 (1994) (criticizing 
the view that Brown did not have a significant impact).  
162  See Kieran Healy, Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1017 (2006). 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 1018. 
165  Id. at 1040. 
105:689  (2011) The New Old Legal Realism 
 735 
One study of one case does not undermine the central assumption of 
the common law system that case law matters.  But it does tell us something 
about how judicial opinions may or may not influence law in the real world.  
This, in turn, should inform our scholarship and teaching. 
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